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Fishbane: Evolution of Energy Policy in the EEC

TROUBLED EVOLUTION OF ENERGY POLICY IN THE EEC:
A DISCORDANT NOTE IN THE HARMONIZATION PROCESS
by
JONATHAN D. FISHBANE*
I. INTRODUCTION

On October24,1991, The WallStreetJournalreportedthatbecause ofpressure from
Member-State governments, including France and Germany, the Commission of the
European Economic Community ("EEC")was slowing its efforts to liberalize the energy sector in anticipation of the then upcoming Maastricht Summit on political and
monetary union. According to the article, the Commission did not want "to risk alienating EC governments ahead of a December summit on treaties for economic and
political union."'
TheJournal'sreport illumined the fact that despite the communitarian spirit revived
by the Single Europe Act of 1986, vital economic and political sectors remained pawns
2
of the centrifugal forces engendered by European nationalism. This tension between
national self-interest and Community institutional cohesion has characterized the evolution of EEC energy policy since the 1950's and has been responsible for repeatedly
setting back target dates for the implementation of a Community-wide policy. Indeed,
and coordinated policy formulation still remains years away
the goal of harmonization
3
sector.
in this key
This article will explore the troubled evolution of EEC energy policy and the attendant institutional and structural tensions that have militated against a cohesive energy
policy and regulatory regime. Certainly, a by-product of such an inquiry is the issue of
whether energy-based decision-making has been predicated upon a communitarian
vision with Pan-European meaning, or whether nationalism and the pressures of the

*J.D., Indiana University (1988); Ph.D. University of Michigan (1981); Mr. Fishbane is currently in private practice
with the law firm of Roetzel & Andress in Akron, Ohio. The author would like to thank Professor Jules Lonbay of
the University of Birmingham, England for his helpful advice during the early stages of the manuscript and Ms. E.
Riley for her assistance in the typing of the final version.
'EC Reins in Energy Liberalization,WALL ST. J., Oct. 24,1991, at A12.
2
For a discussion of the tension between centrifugal and centripetal forces operative within the Community, see
Prodromos D. Dagtoglon, The Legal Nature of the European Community, in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, ThIRTY YEARS OF COMMUNrrY LAW 39-40 (1983). With respect to the Single European Act, see
infra note 264.
3
The different target dates will be discussed in the course of this article. In this regard, in a June, 1991 editorial in
Business Week, Riemer argued that the prohlem of unification was a pervasive one and the "once grand-hopes for a
powerful 'United-States' of Europe coming together by the mid-1990's ar being pushed back at least to the end of
the decade." Blanca Riener, United-States of Europe? Don't Hold Your Breath, BUS. WK., June 17, 1991, at 50.
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historical moment have determined the choice of rules to be made irrespective of long-

term institutional considerations. While it is recognized that energy encompasses a
variety of sources, including petroleum, coal, electricity, geothermal power, and nuclear
energy, this article will focus upon the importance of petroleum products for the evolu-

tion of Community energy policy.

II. SOME PRELIMINARY THEMATIC REMARKS

Energy production, use, and supply were central concerns of the founders of the
European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and the EuropeanAtomic Energy Community (1957).' Yet, the possibilities for political and legal integration inherent in these
Communities were plagued with problems from inception. By itself, coal could not
supply a resurgent Europe with its energy needs. The lack of a community program to
deal with price pressures caused by imported coal, coupled with growing competition
from oil, contributed to serious economic dislocation as evidenced by the Belgian coal
industry crisis in the late 1950's.5 Moreover, French preoccupations with becoming a
nuclear power, and its differences with other Member States on the role of EURATOM,
militated against the collective development of an atomic energy policy that could have
spurred European economic development and political integration.6
With the establishment of the six member EEC under the Treaty of Rome in March,
1957, the potential for a cohesive European energy policy was further hindered.7 The
Treaty of Rome did not contain "special provisions for other energy sources (hydrocarbons, natural gas) and for their specific means for transport (pipelines and gas ducts)"."
The drafters of the Treaty of Rome failed to see "the need for an energy policy as such

4GiancadoOlmi,ntroduction,

in HRY YEARS OF COMMUNrrY LAw 1-3 (1983); JEANMONNET, MEMoIRS 336
(Richard Mayne trans., 1978); ROBERT MARJOLIN, EUROPE IN SEARCH OF ITS IDENTITY 28-35 (1981);
WIJAM
DIEBOLD, THE SCHUMAN PLAN: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC COOPERATION 1950-1959 (1959); ANTHONY
PARRY &
STEPHEN HARDY, EEC LAW 412 (1981); T. Koopmans, The Role ofLaw inthe Next Stage of EuropeanIntegration,
35 INT'L & CoMP. LQ. 925 (1986); Euratom: The Treaty Establishingthe EuropeanAtomic EnergyCommunity,
INT'L Bus. LAw., May, 1990, at 227-229.
5
Gillian M. White, Energy Policy,in TuIRTY YEARS OF CoMMuNrry LAW, supranote 2, at 413-414.
6Cf. ROBERT TOULEMON, 2 L'INTRATION ECONOMrQUE EUROPEENE
(1976). and White, supranote 5,at 41617. See also JACQUELINE D. MATHEWS, THE ASSOCATION SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNTrY
(1977).
7
The three treaties initially had three separate executives: The High Authority of the ECSC,the Commission
for
Euratom, and the Commission of the EEC. Cf. Oni, supra note 4, at 2-3; Guy Schrans, The Community
and Its
Institutions,inTfIRry YEARS OFCOMMUNTrY LAw, supra note 2, at 17; WALTER HAUSTEIN, DIE EUROPAISCHE
GEMEINSCHAFT 214 (1978). See also KLAUS-Dm-rER BORCHARDT, EUROPEAN UNIFICATION: THEORIGINS
AND
GROW-TH OF THE EUROPEAN COMMuNrry (3d ed. 1989).
'Giuseppe Flore, Coopirationentre lesAtats Membres etlesCommunantiseuropeenes en Mati~re d'inergie,
in
GEEaNScIAECHTUND NATIONALE RECHTE 3,111/1 (1971). Flore notes that it is not until 1968
and 1969 in
Council Directives 68/919 and 89/69 that one sees specific provisions for hydrocarbon stockpiling and
research for
industrial and commercial purposes. Id. at 3, 1/1.
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or any need at all for an oil policy different from that applying to the general run of
manufactured products".9 Not only did the Treaty of Rome contain nothing specific with
respect to energy, but also the two other Treaties offered no "clear direction as to an
integrated energy policy".' 0
This failure became especially evident in the wake of the closure of the Suez Canal
during the 1956 Suez crisis. The oil committee of the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.) had recommended emergency oil sharing arrangements- but to no avail.1' With the resumption of low cost petroleum supplies from the
Middle East in 1957, Member States did not develop a long-range Community energy
strategy. Rather, they chose to rely upon existing national policies for controlling extracommunity petroleum imports, including national subsidies for domestic production. 2
In addition, the Community lacked an adequate institutional framework to develop
a common energy policy. "'There existed no Community authority competent to deal
with a common energy policy until 1 July 1967, the day on which the institutions of the
Communities were fused."'1 3 Energy studies were certainly under way by the early
1960's. And, by December, 1968, the Commission had drafted its "First Guidelines for
the Common Energy Policy". But, the "Guidelines" did not go beyond the goals that the
Commission recommended the Community to pursue. 14 As Joseph Kaiser lamented at
the Fifth Intemational Congress for European Law held in Berlin in 1970: "Neither in
the Common Market nor in the German Federal Republic does there exist, in the field
of energy, an inclusive conception of a unified energy economic policy"
(Energiewirtschaftpolitik).5 Further, a Community legal order dealing with energy
was lacking as well. Energy unity thus existed as a function of "abstract desiderata"'16
which left the Community vulnerable to nationalist suspicions and political fragmentation.
This lack of unity still exists. To be sure, since the 1973 energy crisis, greater
attention has been paid to developing policy and to implementing regulations. However,
chronic national rivalries continue to stand in the way ofa truly Community-wide policy.
Equally troublesome are the opinions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the
'TERENCE DArN'mx & LEIGH HANO-ER, ENERGY STRATEGY IN EUROPE 1 (1986).
10PARRY & HARDY, supra note 4, at 412.
" OEEC was viewed as "the European arm of the Marshall Plan." MARGOLIN, supranote 4, at 20.

& HANCHER, supra note 9, at 19. Almost a generation ago, Walter Hallstein observed that national
differenoes coupled with old (and new) rivalries, and the accompanying psychological blockages attendant thereto,
u DAINTrr

have repeatedly hindered the integration-unification process. See, e.g., HALLSMEIN, supranote 7, at 204.

"HALLUIN, supranote 7, at 214.
14
1d. at 216.
t

Joseph H. Kaiser, Das Zusammenwirken der europaischen Rechtsordnung mil den nationalen Rechtsornungen-

Kommission III: Energie, in GEmEiNSOAFrSRECHT UND NATlONALE RECHT

supra note 8, at 1, MI/3.

1Id. at 2, I3.
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1970's and 1980's which legally supported national decision-making at the expense of
Community authority in cases involving energy policy issues. 17
In this context, whether there exists a truly European energy policy and legal structure will affect European Political Cooperation and the concern with speaking with one
voice in foreign policy, 8 and with that, the possibility of collective military cooperation
as first envisioned by the Founding Fathers in the 1950's in the form of a European
Defense Community. 9 Absent a cohesive energy policy and regulatory regime, the
Community will be confronted with what its founders sought to avoid: a fundamentally
centrifugal arrangement of independent and self-interested nation-states. And the goal
of Community integration will be at the mercy of the shifting moods of a fragile coalition
mentality.
III. THE EEC AND ENERGY: 1957-1973
Nicholas Green has argued that a serious flaw in the vision of the Founding Fathers
was their inability to foresee that the future of the Community's energy needs could be
based upon anything other than coal or nuclear energy.20
The emergence and rise of OPEC and the ascendancy ofoil over other fuels
were developments that fell outside this vision. Consequently, there is no
treaty provision for a common energy policy nor a timetable for its elaboration. Unlike agriculture or transport, for which express nucleated treated
provisions exist, the responsibility for energy matters is fragmented. 2
Given the fact that in 1950 only 10% of the energy needs of the original Six was
based upon oil, one understands why the "Founding Fathers" focused on coal and
nuclearenergy. However, the closure of the Suez Canal, coupled with OEEC studies and
recommendations concerning a common strategy in the event of future crises, alerted
"7This will be seen later, for example, in the discussion pertinent to BP v. Commission, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister

for Industry and Energy, and Bulk Oil (Zug) AG v. Sun International Lid. (1986). See infra p. 22, VI.

"See EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION (EPC) (5th ed. 1988) [hereinafter EPC] (the documentary collection
produced by the German Federal Republic). See also Daniel T. Murphy, The System of EuropeanCooperation: A
BriefExplanation, 10 N.CJ. INT'L L & COM. REG. 383 (1985); Maarten WJ. Lak, InteractionBetween European
PoliticalCooperationandthe EuropeanCommunity (External)-Existing Rules andChallenges,26 COMioN MKT.
L REV. 281 (1989); Simon J. Nuttall, EuropeanPoliticalCooperation, 3 YB. OF EUR. LAW 267 (1983); Note, A
Community Within a Community: Prospectsfor ForeignPolicyIntegrationin the EuropeanCommunity, 103 HARV.
L REV. 1066 (1990).
'Cf. MARGOIN, supra note 4, at 36; MONNET, supra note 4, at 349. While the French launched the idea of a
European Defense Community in 1950, it was also responsible for dashing the Pl6ven Plan in 1954 when the French
National Assembly refused to sanction a plan that would put any onstraints on its army. BORCHARDT, supranote
7, at 11-12.
'Nicholas Green, The LegalBasisofa Community Energy Policy, 8 EUR. L REV. 52,52 (1983).
21
id.
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them to the growing economic importance of oil As A.C. Evans has noted: "Community institutions could hardly tackle the problems of coal and nuclear power without
taking account of problems raised by oil." Further, the Common Market's goal of
eliminating barriers to free economic activity applied to the oil sector as well. u

Interest in formulating acommon energy policy that would take oil into account goes
back to the late 1950's. For example, linked to the Treaty was the Protocol of Rome

which was concerned with the politics of energy and the coordination of a collective
policy.' Moreover, by 1959, the Commission had found that the cost of European coal
was rising more quickly than imported oil; a state of affairs that was considered significant for the future of European investment and economic growth.2
In June, 1962, the Interexecutive Committee forenergy (which was created in 1959)

produced a memorandum on energy policy. It offered two options. One option favored
a free and open market that would allow market forces "to benefit from the lowest
possible price for energy" in products such as oil. The other option favored political
assistance to the coal community?21 The Interexecutive Memorandum was refined by the
Council of Ministers. In 1964, it adopted a more conservative Protocol of Agreement;

the goal of which was "to build the foundation for a pragmatic coordination of national
policies of such a nature so as to prepare the way for an energy policy." 8
The 1962 Interexecutive Memorandum was a response to the Ministers' call for a
study that would address problems posed by oil and petroleum products;29 including the
doubling of oil consumption since the Suez Crisis and the recognition that 90% of that
nIn an article published in 1963, Fritz Hellwig, like Mr. Green. maintained that even with the events of 1956-57, the
importance of oil was not foreseen. See FritzHellwigMiglichkeitenundGrenzeneinrkoordiniertenEnergiepoltik
im GemeinsamMarlk, in ENERGIEPOLITIKIMGEMEINSAMMARKT 14(1963). Moreover, sinceits creationin 1948,
the OEEC committees had explored not only the importance of coal and electricity but also of petroleum. Their
findings were brought to the Founders' auention in the Armand Report (1955) and the Hartley Report (1956). See
alsoJEAN BRIMOND, LA COORDINATION 1bNERGETIQUE EN EUROPE: IDtE- ETR.EASATIONS DANS L'EUROPE
DESIx 81 (1961).
"Andrew C. Evans, The Development of a Community Policy in Oil, 17 COMMON MiT. L REv. 371,371 (1980).
24That the framers of the Rome Treaty intended to apply Treaty provisions to oil is evidenced by List F of Annex I
of the Treaty and the Protocol on Mineral Oils and Certain of Their Derivatives which was signed along with the
Treaty. In this regard, List F posited a zero duty on crude oil importation from third countries. Id. at 372.
2Cf Hellwig, supra note 22,at 13.
t6
See THE SECOND GENERAL REPORT OF THE EUROPEON COMMUNrIEs 49 (1959); Evans, supra note 23, at 371
n.l.
57
See GUY DECARMOY, LEDOSSIER EUROPI ENEDEL' ANRGIE 180(1980). See alsoEliasm6llerDieVorschldge
derEWG-Kommissionfr einePolitikder Gemeinchafa fdem Erdsektor und ihr Beitragan der Schaffung einer
gemeinamen Erdblpolitik, in ENERGIEPOUTIK, ROLLE UND BEDEUTUNGSWANDEL DER EINZELNEN

ENERGIETRAGER at 49. (no date). Eliasmder's essay was delivered as part ofa conference on energy held in Austria
in November, 1966.
1id. at 180-81. The Protocol offered general goals such as the security and stability of energy stocks as well as
contained provions for consumer free choice.
2Evans, supra note 23, at 373.
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oil was produced outside of Europe. By the early 1960's, it had become clear that
European economic growth and stability were tied to the growing dependence upon
foreign oil.
In December, 1962, Dr. Marcello Boldrini, the President of the Ente Nazionale
Idrocarbui (END and the Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli (AGIP), argued before a
conference on energy at Bad Godesburg that the EEC had to confrornt the fact that oil was
crucial to modem European industrial development Hence, a Community-wide energy
policy not only had to include it, but also had to factor in the growing importance of the
oil industry inthe economic and political life ofpost-WarEurope. According to Boldrini,
EEC policy had to place the public interest ahead of that of private undertakings. To
achieve this, the Community had to strengthen the legal and political foundations of its
competence and become an autonomous and sovereign entity in its own sphere much as
an individual nation-state is within its own institutional system. This was especially
critical in the area of energy since the Treaty of Rome contained no provisions for a
collective energy policy.3°
Boldrini's challenge to the EEC to strengthen its authority with respect to energy met
with limited action. The Community did acknowledge that a general program for the
abolition ofexisting restrictions on freedom of services among Member States pursuant
to Article 63 should include oil as an important service.3 ' It also began to realize that it
would be in what Boldrini saw as the public interest to grant oil companies licenses for
oil exploration in Member States otherthan theirown. By linking licensing and services,
the development of a Community-wide oil industrial capacity could be enhanced?3
While theTreaty ofRome contained no energy policy provisionsperse, Community
leaders increasingly looked to various articles in the Treaty to ensure that the "new legal
order" announced in Van GendenLoos v.NederlanseTariffCommissie(1963) and Costa
vENEL(1964) wouldhavejuridical force inthe area ofenergyplanning. 33 Butthe crucial
stumbling block to legal integration remained the lack of harmonization of national
energy policies.3 This lack derivednot only from powerfulnationaldifferences, but also
" Marcello Boldrini, Gemneinsam Marki auf der Grundlage billiger und sicherer Energieversorgung, in
ENERGIEPOLTFIK IM G MENSAMEN MARKT at 41-44 (1963).
31
See TREATY ESTABuSHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNrrY [EEC TREATY] art. 63, reprinted in BASIC
COMMUNITY LAWS 45 (Bernard Rudden & Derrick Wyan eds., 2d ed. 1986). See also General Progranae For the
Abolition of Restrictons of Freedom to Provide Services (1961), reprinted in BASIC COMMUNITY LAWS, supra, at
249-52.
nSee Boldrini, supra note 30, at 41-44; See also BLONDEL-SPINEu, L'NiERIE DANS L'EUROPE DE SIX at 308
(1966), and Council Directive 64/428, Art. 2(2), 1964 OJ. SPEC. SUPp. 1871. In this regard, Directive 64/428 also
looks to Treaty Article 54(2) and (3).
"Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEI, C.M.L. R. 425, 455 (1964); Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlanse Tariff Conmnssie, 2
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 129 (1963).
"BLONDEL-SPINELLI, supra note 32, at 99.
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from the fact that, especially with respect to petroleum, the Community deferred to
Member State policy-making authority once conditions normalized in the aftermath of
the Suez crisis.
In the case of France, for example, where the government controlled oil imports and
refined petroleum products, the Commission had to deal with a national policy that
themned the goal ofeliminating quantitative restrictions onmeasureshaving an equivalenteffectas setforthinArticles 30-37 oftheTreaty.3 In its relationshipwith De Gaulle's
France, the Commission tried to avoid antagonizing French political sensitivities. Thus,
it did not invoke the forceful language of Articles 30,32, or 34 which directly proscribe
Member States from introducing measures having equivalent effects or increasing existing quotas. Rather, the Commission looked to the linguistically milder and legally
gradualist approach contained in Article 37 and Article 90.3 Article 37, for example,
of a
provides that "Member States shall progressively adjust any state monopolies
commercial character so as to ensure that when the transitionalperiod endedno discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exist
between nationals of Member States."
And Article 90(2) provides that" [undertakings entrusted with the operation of general
economic interest" shall be subject to rules of competition "in so far as the application
does not obstruct the performane, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned the n."A
The Commission's preference for Articles 37 and 90 revealed a legal and political

tension that militated against a unified policy. While the Commission sought to act in

the general interestby asserting a defensible legal position viaa gradualist accumulation
of authority, it also implicitly chose to deferto national authority if it could be shown that
undertakings having a general economic interest would be hindered by Community

rules. This approach left unresolved the question of whether Treaty obligations connected to Community energy requirements were superior to a national policy predicated
upon national needs.
The outbreak of war in the Middle East in 1967 sharpened these tensions. After the
Six Day War in June, 1967, some Arab countries tried to boycott those EEC nations
suspected ofbeing pro-Israel and which still sought to importArab oil. Fortunately, "the
main disruption of supplies... arose from shortages of tanker capacity precipitated when
oil suddenly had to be moved around the Cape."" However, the 1967 War, and the
31See DENSToUREr. LER IE FRANCAIs D'IMPOATION DU PrOLEET LA COWMMUT #MONQUE
EUROPEENE at 73 (1968).
mid. at 83. See also Evans, supra nom 23. at 375-76.
3EEC TREATY

a. 37,reprinted in BASIC COMmUNnTY LAWS. supra note 31, at 33 (emphasis added).

34Id. at 53.
,Jack Hainshom. Europe's Energy Imports in A NATION WRrr LARGE?: FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEM[S BEPORE
THE EUROpEAN COMMUNrY 116 (Max Kohnstaanm & Wolfgang Hager e&., 1973).
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concomitant disruption of supply, underscored the economic vulnerability of the Community because of its dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil.
Accordingly, both the O.E.C.D. and the European Commission took up the question
of energy supply. O.E.C.D. Oil Committee discussions led to a voluntary agreement
among Member States to work out ways to improve the stockpiling of supplies as well
as emergency procedures to distribute them. 4° The involvement of the Commission in
O.E.C.D. discussions not only led to its 1968 memorandum entitled: "First Guidelines
for the Common Energy Policy"; but also to the Council's enactment of Directives 68/
414 and 68/416 pursuant to the conjunctural policy provisions of Article 103 of the
41
Treaty.
A.

The 1968 Guidelines

The title of the Commission's Memorandum implicitly recognized the reality that
previous protocols, decisions, and studies had not led to a coordinated energy policy
capable of imposing strict rules upon the market.42 While the "Guidelines" recalled the
aims of the 1964 Protocol, including having low cost and secure energy supplies,43 it
admitted that the Community had to transcend the aims and objectives stage. Energy
products had not become integrated into a common market in the manner that agriculture, for example, had become integrated. Hence, if this situation did not improve, and
if a common energy market was not achieved in the near future, the level of integration
already attained would be endangered. 4 Sounding an alarum that not only had rattled
the walls of the Community since inception, but also was prophetic of EEC political
cooperation in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, the Commission held that nationalism
and the lack of harmonization threatened to disintegrate a truly European community.
Disparities between costs of use of energy resulting primarily from divergences between energy policies of the individual Member States are increasingly distorting competition in industries with high energy consumption and penalize certain regions ofthe Community when important invest"'SeeA.C. Evans,EuropeanCommunityLawandthe Problemof Oil Shortages. 31 INT'L
& CoMP. LQ. 1,5 (1982).
See Bulletin of the European Community, No. 12, Supplement (1968) [hereinafter Bull. of
E.C.]; Council Directive
of20Dec. 1968 (68/414),1 968-19690J. SPEC. ED.No. L308/14; Council Decision of 2ODec.
1968(68/416),1 9681969 OJ. SPEC. ED. No. L 308/19; See also Evans, supra note 40, at 5-6.
42
In this context, in the 1960's, Maurice Bye offered the following definition of policy:
A policy is a coherent group of decisions destined to attain, at a given time, one or several
quantitatively and qualitatively determined objectives. It defines the means and proper actions
and rules
of conduct to follow... Being, by definition, a choice, it is not governed by the market but
assumes
an imprint (emprise) upon the market ....
BLONDELL-SPINELLI, supranote 32, at 7. See also DAIqrrr & HANCHER, supra note
9, at 20-21.
3
' BuIL of E.C., No. 12 , supranote 41, at 6 & n. The Commission noted that
it did "not think it necessary to defme
again the aims of a Community energy policy, which the Member States fixed in the protocol
of 1964". Id.
"Id. at 5.
4t
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ment decisions are to be taken. The attempts made to remedy this state of
things by measures at the national level are leading to a gradual disintegration of the Community's energy economy. Uneconomic systems of aid,
consumption taxes varying from country to country and increasingly nationalistsupply and marketing policies are the result. This dangerous trend
can only be changed by a Community energy policy which fully integrates
the energy sector into a common market.'
Despite the almost Jeremiad call "to change things before it was too late", the
Guidelines offered precious little as to how to institutionalize such change. The Commission acknowledged that more than half of the Community's energy requirements
came from imports.' Yet, in its "Framework for Action" section, it offered only broad
theoretical proposals. For example, concerning supplying the Community with oil and
natural gas, it merely stated that "there is a need for a study of the supply and demand
conditions on the world market foran assessment of import requirements and investment
expenditures."4 7 Conceming the potential disruption of supply ofpetroleum imports, the
Commission blandly proposed the following: 1) the need for a permanent study of the
supply possibilities open to the Community, of the risks of disruption, and of the means
for coping with disruption; and 2) a stockpiling policy that could be applied to crude oil
products and nuclear fuels as part of an overall supply policy.'
The Commission was quite aware that any attempt to institutionalize the proposed
guidelines had to first deal with the problems presented by national policy and independent state action. Indeed, it admitted that
all or nearly all the aspects of energy economy are governed by special
arrangements, both in the Community Member States and outside the
Community. State intervention ranges from bans or restrictions on imports
to the control of marketing or of prices and to various provisions affecting
the interplay of supply and demand.'
As a threshold matter, the Community would have to develop a policy that would try to
harmonize Community ends with national needs.'

45 1d. (emphasis added).
"Id. at 6.
47 1d. at 10.
"id. at 11.
4
9ld. at 8.
'Old. at 9.
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B. The PostGuidelinesDirectives
Despite its generality,the Guidelineshelped to create rules that obligated Member
States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and petroleum. For example, Directive
68/414 and Decision 68/416 were enacted pursuant to Article 103 of the Treaty which
was utilized for the purpose of crisis analysis. 1 Thus, energy policy was linked to the
conjunctural policies of Member States "as a matter of common concern" and "if any
difficulty should arise in the supply of certain products." 2 Directive 68/414 acknowledged more explicitly than the Guidelinesthat"a crisis in obtaining supplies could occur
unexpectedly."5 3 Therefore, it was necessary to increase the security of supply for crude
oil and petroleum products in Member States by maintaining a 65 day minimum stock
of such products.'6 If crude oil was indigenously produced, this minimum could be
reduced by 15%.5s In addition, implementation of the Directive underArticle (6) could
be achieved by individual agreements "within the territory of a Member State or the
account of undertakings established within another Member State."5 6
Yet, the Directive's approach seemed to be more concerned with voluntarism than
with creating a legal framework to enforce agreements. A. C. Evans has argued that
detailed provisions for these agreements were set forth in Council Decision 6 8/ 4 1 6 .5
However, his argument exaggerates the scope of the Decision. Article I, for example,
merely states that if an agreement could not be reached within eight months pursuant to
Article 6(2) of Directive 68/414, then the governments were to notify the Commission;
and the Commission, in turn, "may propose to the governments concerned appropriate
measures for overcoming their difficulties.!"'
In fact, the concept of individual agreements enunciated in the Directive seems
detached from a meaningful regulatory regime thatcould coordinate policy on a Community-wide basis. For example, as a general rule, the agreements were to be for an
unlimited duration." However, they could contain a unilateral termination provision as
long as the Commission received advance notice with respect thereto. In addition, while

s Cf. Council Directive 68/414, supra note 41 and Council Decision 68/416, spra note 41.

=Cf.EEC TRETy art. 103(1)-(4), reprinted in BAsic CoMMUNrrY LAWS, supra not 31, at 59.
SCoundl Directive 68/414, spra note 41, at 586.
'Id.

"Id.
"Id.at 587. A.C. Evans has contended thatthese agreements were to be allowed so that Directive 68/414 "would not
exacerbate the problem of excess storage and reng

capacity; a problem which had long been recognized by the

Commission." Evans, spra note 40, at 5.
" Evans traced Commission recognition back to the 1963 Memorandum of the Interexecutive Energy Group. Id. at
5 n.18.
'Council Directive 681416,supra note 41, at 591; and Council Dirextive 68/414, supra note 41, at 587.
"Council Dirextive 68/414, spra note 41, at 587.
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unilateral termination "shall not operate during a supply crisis,'*w a clearly articulated
enforcement mechanism to deal with a violation was missing. Hence, even though
Article 6(2) of Directive 68/414 encouraged greater inter-governmental cooperation, it
reflected the Community's continued reticence to assert greater legal and institutional
control over energy policy and planning. 1 It thus missed an opportunity to begin
building a regulatory structure that could hold in check centrifugal forces that would
prove so destructive in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
Like acrobats on a high-wire, the Commission and the Council were still inching
their way toward a coherent conjunctural energy policy; and with it, toward some measure of legal control without upsetting delicate national political sensitivities. In so
doing, the Community admitted its institutional weakness vis 4 vis the Member States
in the area of energy policy and often stood in the way of the very harmonization it sought
to achieve. This is afortiorithecase in Commission proposals to align 1) national excise
duties on petroleum products; and 2) national policies concerning the importation of
hydrocarbons from third countries. Neither proposal was accepted nor enacted by the
Council.2
Nevertheless, the Council did adopt Regulations 1055/72 and 1056/72 which involved notifying the Commission of 1) imports of crude oil and natural gas; and 2)
investment projects in the petroleum,natural gas, and electricity sectors. But the purpose
of Regulation 1055/72 was primarily informational innature and designed"to enable the
Commissionto assess the supply situation" within the Member States pursuant toArticle
213.63 Not surprisingly, therefore, the regulation did not have a procedural mechanism
that would enable the Commission to act decisively in the event of a supply breakdown.
Moreover, while Article I of Regulation 1055172 obligated Member States to notify
the Commission of crude oil and natural gas imports from third countries," there were

no real legal restrictions placed upon them concerning trade in oil and petroleum products. National initiatives thus retained supremacy at the expense of harmonization. This
point can be further illustrated by the fact that by 1973, the French were still unwilling
*ld.
6IId. Article 6(2) provides that for the purposes of implementation, "stocks may be established wnder individual
of a Member State for the account of mdertakings established
agreements between governments, within the terory
in another Member State." Id.
"See, e g., Propositionde dirediw du Counseil sur la rapprochmntde taes spicj "quesde cowswptionfrappant
les hydrocarburesliquidt destinies d itre utilisieconhne combustiblesin OJ. (1970) No. C 14125 and Proposalfor
a Council Directiw onathe harmization of excise duties on mineral o// in OJ. No. C 92/36. See also Evans, supra
note 23.
- Commission Regulation 1055172. 1972 OJ. SPEC ED. 462,463. Article 213 provides that the Commission may.
within the limits established by the council, 'collect any informaion and carry out any checks required for the
pedonmanceoftasksentrmstedtoii" See EEC TREATY an. 213, reprinted in BASIC COMMUNITY LAWS, supra note
31. at 102.
" Commission Regulation 1055/72, supranote 63, at 462-63.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1994

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 27 [1994], Iss. 3, Art. 2

AKRON LAW REVIEw

[Vol. 27:3,4

to abandon their monopoly unless the Community adopted a dirigistepolicy which, by
its very nature, would only serve to polarize the Member States. In the face of French
intransigence, the institutional weakness of the Community became only too evident.
The Commission "failed to obtain significant adjustments of the monopoly and was
indeed still authorizing the French to maintain consequential barriers to intra-Community trade on the basis ofArticle 115." 0 In fact, the Commission even authorized France
"to maintain its quota system until the end of 1975."66
Viewed from the vantage point of 1973, aside from Directive 73/238, which was
passed before the Yom Kippur War with the goal of providing emergency measures to
mitigate the effects ofpetroleum supply difficulties,6 Community energy policy was illequipped to deal with a crisis. It was "negative, both in regard to the development of
specific solutions to energy problems and even with respect to the regular application and
development ofageneral Community regime as it affected the energy sector." It neither
confronted the political dimensions of petroleum directly, nor did it actively seek a
"politically safer fuel." In early 1973, Jack Hartshorn correctly perceived that if the
Community chose "to develop a 'politically safer fuel' at home or abroad to improve the
security of supply, it must be prepared to pay a premium for safety. The failure to make
such a choice by October, 1973 was disastrous to both Community integration and the
economies of the Member States.
IV.THE ENERGY CRISIS AND THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION
A. The EEC and the Events of October,1973
With the Yom Kippur War, the inherent weakness of the existing energy regulatory
regime became painfully clear. "The outbreak of the oil crisis in October, 1973 found
the European Community unprepared."'7 Rules governing energy were insufficient to
deal with the Arab oil embargo, the reduction in crude oil production, and the quadrupling of oil prices. OPEC's goal was to use oil as a weapon to shift the political and

" DAINTrH & HANCHER, supra note 9, at 25.
"Id. at 25 & n.48.
"Council Directive 73/238, 1973 OJ.(1228) 1.
DAINITH & HANOHER, supra note 9, at 22.
"Hartshom, supra note 39, at 116.
7oELKETHME BIANZ UND PERSPEKVEN DER EUROPAisc-N GEM ESCHAF'r 112 (1983). Michel Godet
and
Olivier Ruyssen understate the problem with their contention that the energy disarray was due to a large degree
to
the inability to forecast the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-1974. While it may be granted
that 'models for long
term forecasting were based on a continuation of the falling price of oil in constant money
terms', such a claim
disguises the weakness of the energy regime including the Commission's recognition that an unexpected
crisis could
hurt the EEC. Cf. MCHEL GODEr & OLVER RUYSSEN, THE OLD WORLD AND THE NEW
TECHNOLOGIES:

CHALLENGES To EUROPE IN A HOSTILE WORLD 58 (1981).
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diplomatic balance fiom a generally pro-Israeli position to a pro-Arab one' Given the
EEC's enormous dependence on Middle Eastern oil, it had to go along with OPEC's
decisions.
'
The events of October "put a strain on solidarity everywhere."' Where solidarity
"should have been the order of the day in the Fall of 1973," each Member State looked
first to its own self-interestZ3 Nationalist sentiment stood in the way of theTreaty's goals
and threatened to undermine the foundation of a European community. For example,
the Arab embargo hit the Dutch the hardest. Dutch support of the Israelis resulted in a
complete embargo on Arab oil shipments to Holland. The Dutch plea for oil sharing
assistance, pursuant to O.E.C.D. guidelines, fell on deaf ears. In retaliation, they threatened to cut off supplies of North Sea natural gas. Yet, the Dutch were fundamentally
isolated and their efforts to obtain Community legal and political support to guarantee
4
security of supply came to naught.7

On November 21, 1973, the British government notified Holland that it would not
be sending it oil because the Arab oil producing states had threatened reprisals if such
aid were given. Moreover, pointing to the inherent weakness of the EEC legal regime
in energy (to which its dirigsmecontributed), the French government advised that since
there was no real Community energy policy, it had no legal obligation to maintain
European solidarity in this area?' Underthe influence of itsForeign MinisterM. Joubert,
the French did not want to jeopardize their relationship with the Arabs "by too overtly
manifesting its solidarity with European partners" such as the Dutch.' Thus, it was no
accident that under the economic pressure generated by the oil crisis, and the inherent
weakness of Community laws and institutions to deal with it, Member States sought to
work out their own bilateral oil arrangements with the Arab states - with France leading
the way.7 1

SSee WERNEm J. FED, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrY IN WoRLD AFFAIRS: ECONOMIC POWER AND POLICAL
INFLUENCE 279 (1976); TmL, supra note 70, at 113; see also de Bauw, Energy,in THE COMMUNIYTODAY 181
(1983).
nMONNEr, s&Vra note 4, at 508.
7FELD, spra note 71, at 283.
74
See id at 284; see also DAINTrHr& HANCQER, supra note 9, at 26.
7 THIoF supra note 70, at 113-15.
7
6id. See also TOULEMON, supra note 6, at 222.
7TOULEMON, supra note 6, at 222.
- Even with the Algerian nationalization of oil in 1971, which reslted in a French minority shareholder position,
France continued a patem of goverment-to-govemmt deals. When Iraq nainmalizmd as oil fields in the early
1970s, France moved quiddy to conclude a deal with that country to ensure its supply of crude oil Cf. Hartshorn,
supra note 39, at 120.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1994

13

Akron Law Review, Vol. 27 [1994], Iss. 3, Art. 2

AKRON LAw REvEW

[Vol. 27:3,4

With its controlled energy market and dirigisteapproach to energy, France had a
history of seeking government-to-government sales agreements to secure its own supply
from OPEC. In the wake of the 1973 crisis, France was also joined by other Member
States, such as Belgium, Germany, and Great Britain, "in seeking such deals with the
objective of getting a direct and secure supply" for themselves.7 Well before the crisis,
Walter Hallstein perceived the fundamentally cynical nature of this nationalist policy
when he wrote "if only energy policy on a purely national basis carried conviction."
B. The Energy Crisisand the Problem of EuropeanPoliticalCooperation
Since the Hague Communiqud of the Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of2 December 1969, it had been a goal ofthe Member States
to make the EEC a coordinate political actor in foreign affairs as well as to find ways to

achieve European political unification.1' Pursuant to Paragraph 15 of the subsequent

Communiqud issued on July 20,1970, the Foreign Ministers of the Member States filed
the Luxembourg Report on October 27, 1970. They argued that implementation of
common policies had to be linked to "corresponding developments in the political
sphere." This was necessary if Europe was ever to have a foreign policy mechanism
that would permit her "to speak with one voice. 6 3 The Paris Summit of the Heads of
State of 21 October 1972 sought to improve the means to coordinate political union and
foreign policy. The Heads of State agreed that consultations should be intensified at all
levels. The Foreign Ministers would meet four times per year and follow-up on the
Luxembourg Report by the summer of 1973.8
At the end of the Paris Summit, less than one year before the outbreak ofhostilities
in the Middle East, the Heads of States expressed their intention "to transform before the
end of the present decade, the whole complex of their relations into a European Union." 5
This objective was nearly shattered by the events of 1973. In fact, the oil crisis set in
motion by the Yom Kippur War profoundly affected the December, 1973 Copenhagen
Summit.
- Paul KeiezisThe PoliticsofEnergy, EuropeanCommunity, No.206(1978), at4l. See
also DavidAllen, The EuroArab Dialogue, 16 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD. 323 (1978).
"HALLSrEIN, supra note 7, at 213.
"Cf EPC, supra note 18, at 22-31.
'1d. at 30. See also Otto von der Gablenz, Lazembourg Revisited or the Importance of
EuropeanPoliticalCooperation,1
MKT.REV.685(1979); HE
KRAMER&RMNHARDRUMMEGEMEINSaRAF BMJ)UNG
WEUTEMOPAS IN DER AUSSENPOIrrK (1978); Murphy, supra note 18.
'0EPC, supra note 18, at 26. "Desirous of making progress in the field of political unification
the government decide
to cooperate in the sphere of foreign policy." Id. at 31; see also Lak, supra note 18, at
285-86
" Cf. Statement of the Conferenoe of the Heads of State and Government of the European
Community (Paris, 31
October1972), reprinted in EPC supra note 18, at 31. The Paris Summit was followed
by the Copenhagen Report
of July 1973 in whid institutions and procedures for political cooperation were recommended
by the Foreign
Ministers. Id. at 31-48; see also Murphy, spranote 18, at 384-86.
"EPC supra note 18, at 32.
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The goal of the Summit was to make progress toward economic and political union
and to have the Community speak with one voice. Such efforts were inherently problematic in the wake of the rejection of aid to Holland, the French contempt for EEC
energy policy, and the pursuit of purely national objectives to obtain energy supplies in
disregard of the Community interest.
In anticipation of the Copenhagen Summit, The Tumes of London reported on 3
and mutual suspicions in
December 1973 "[w]ith the energy crisis generating fears....
were not promising."M
cohesion
European
for
prospects
the
Nine,"
the
of
capitals
the
Discussions between Sheikh Yamani and the Dutch Economic Minister Mr.Lubbers did
not, according to Mr.Yamani, lead to progress in Dutch efforts to improve relations with
the Arabs. Accordingly, the Arab oil embargo would not be li.fted Two days later, The
Tues reported that some five hours of discussion on the energy situation by the Ministers
of the Nine did nothing "to allay Dutch fears that their Community partners might let
'
them down if the Arab oil embargo bites deep into their economic life. " In this fearful
climate, Willy Brandt's call for an agreement on Community solidarity on oil at the
9
Copenhagen Summit seemed more urgent than ever" Tragically, the call was not
heeded.
In the face of Member State nationalism, the weakness of Community institutions
was underscored further when Henn Simonet, the European Commission member responsible for energy policy, had to kow tow to British and French officials who insisted
'
that"this was notthe time forpaperwork but for discrete consultations. " Mon. Simonet
thus produced "an oral rather than written list of possible actions by the Nine to coordinate their policies."'9 Simonet's frustration was echoed a few days later by Wilhelm
Haferkamp, Vice President of the Commission, who ominously declared in a speech in
Bonn that if the EEC was to survive at all, it needed a community energy policy.
Tension mounted when it was announced that "Foreign Ministers from several oil
producing Arab states [would be] in Copenhagen .. to seek contact with Foreign Ministers of the EEC." 2 Their arrival put pressure on Summit leaders and shifted their
attention away from key political business. As The Tunes correspondent reported:

"See Roger Berthoud, Moment ofTndhApproachingforEEC,THETBES. Dec. 3,1973, at 4; see alro Allen. supra
note 79, at325-26.
"'SeeBenhoud, supra note 86.
"Roger Berhoud, Dutch Hint of EEC Delay Tactics If OilIs Not Shared, TiE TMES, Dec. 5,1973, at1.
"Id.
9Id.
" Id.
"Arabs to be inCopenhagenforEWCSummit, ThETIMES, Dec. 13,1973, at 1. The French Forign Minister Joubert
rather tmcwotuly and disingenuously looked to the Summit as a 'tea of trth" concerning the reality of a United
Europe in the face of crisiL Id.
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In avery real sense the uncovenanted anival here ofoil ministers from
oil producing countries in the Middle East has.., hijacked the summit
talks. For most of today their movements and statements made in their
name have dominated the talk in the corridors and antechambers of the
Conference itself....91
In this atmosphere of crisis and nationalist suspicion, it was psychologically and
politically significant that the document drafted by the Foreign Ministers was "a document on the European Identity.' 4 In fact, the crisis in energy was linked to this crisis of
European identity. In early 1974, Rudolf Herit poignantly wrote in Die Zei.
The number of words published in the Hague Communiqu on energy policy
stood diametrically opposed to collective actions (gemeinsamen Taten).
The nine countries let themselves be divided among each other... by the
oil producing states. Two of them, France and England, have prostituted
(gebuhlt)themselves with a painful lack of dignity in order to win the good
will of theArabs. TheirpartnerHolland was fully forgotten; a partner which
had pushed tirelessly for English admission into the Community. The feeling for solidarity is truly underdeveloped in the Community"
Similarly, in hisMemoirs,Jean Monnet recalled that Europe "had once again shown
the world the sad spectacle of selfishness and disunion."' The swan song of European
identity, political cooperation, and integration would remain a dissonant one until the
Member States decided to take the interests of the Community seriously; including
developing a legal regime that would guarantee the common interestY7
V. BEYOND 1973; EEC ENERGY INITIATIVES
The Copenhagen Summit was a failure." European leaders turned a deaf ear to
Willy Brandt's call for solidarity in the area of energy. However, to its credit, the
European Commission renewed its efforts to push for a common policy, and tried to limit
the number ofbilateral deals between Member States and the oil producing states. 9 One

" David Wood, Prime Minister Faces EBC Pressure For Plan to Share Oil Resources, THE TIMES.
Dec. 15, 1973,
at 5.
" EPC, supra note 18, at 57-63.
"Rudolf Herlt, Mit Phantasie gegen Fakten, DIE ZEin', Jan. 11, 1974.
"MONNEr, supra note 4. at 511.
9id.; see also Herit, supra note 95.
"Jean Monnet refernd to it as a "spectacular failure" in which "the Heads of State and Government
lost control over
their meeting." MONNET, supra note 4. at 510.
"FELD, supra note 71, at 285.
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possibility lay in broader cooperation with the United States and Japan in order to
establish an energy action group to overcome energy problems.'
In February, 1974, the United States convened a multi-national energy conference
to deal with the problem of energy supply. France again stood in the way ofcooperation.
It refused to participate on the alleged grounds that the Americans were trying to use the

conference in order to dominate European economic and political life. French protests
were a smoke-screen for its real behavior. At that time, France was "negotiating pacts
with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya that would guarantee it millions of barrels of oil
' '1°
in return for stepped up deliveries of French weapons technology to the producers. 1
Despite the French boycot, and its underlying political agenda, the Washington

Conference resulted in an agreement between the remaining EEC members and other
OECD nations with respect to establishing an autonomously functioning International
Energy Agency (lEA) within the OECD. 02 In this regard, on November 18, 1974, the

International Energy Program (JEP) was completed. It provided that in the event of a
1°
collective or individual shortfall, energy supplies would be supplied by IEAmembers.
Its objective was to coordinate mutual self-sufficiency in oil stocks and supplies, reduce
demand during a crisis, and allocate available oil equitably among its membership in the

event of an emergency. The emergency allocation procedure would be activated only
when one or more of the TEA Member nations, or all the participating nations as a group,
suffered a reduction of 7% or more in the daily rate of oil supplies.'

"This possibility was suggested by Henry Kissinger in December, 1973. Cf. Arabs to be in CopenhagenforEEC
Summit, supranote 92. The Kissingerproposal also received favorable press in Germany. See, e.g., Theo Sonmaners'
comments in DE ZErr, Jan. 11, 1974.
101
FEL, supra note 71, at285. See alsoPaul G. Taylor, THE L&m OF EUROPEAN INrEGRAT1ON 151 (1983). In
this context, French behavior not only inhibited any effort to control bilateral arranganents, it also served as a model
foraction by others in the European community as well as for the Americans-4n spite of theirpublic rejection of such
bilateralism. FELD, supranote 71, at 286.
t
The Commission was given the status of observer within the IEA. While France, a non-signatofy nation, viewed
the agency as onfrotational with respect to OPEC, it nevertheless found it politically important to be represented
on the OECD's Committee for Energy Policy which was created in April, 1975. See J.G. Van der Linde & R. Lefeber,
InternationalEnergy Agency Captures the Development of European Community Energy Law, 22 J. OF WORLD
TRADE 5 (1989); Re The InternationalEnergy Programme:Notice ofthe Commission, 1 COMMON MKT. L REV.
92,92 (1984); Evans, supranote 40, at 4; see alsoU. Lantzke, The InternationalEnergy Agency, 26 EUR. YB. 41
(1978).
'Cf. Case83/671 In relnt'lEnergyProgramme,2C.M.L.R. 186(1984). TEL, supranote69,at 117-18; DAInITFH
& HANOtHE, supra note 108, at 27; see also Van der Linde & Lefeber, spranote 102. Founding members of the
IEAincluded: Austria, Canada, EEC (excluding France), Japan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. Concerning the objectives of the EEA, see ENERGY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 13 (4th ed. 1991).
'See Re The InternationalEnergy Programme: Notice of the E.C. Commission, 1 C.M LR. 92,92-95 (1984).
Andrew Evans has argued that the 7% shortfall activation mechanism illustrates a defect in the 1EP since prior to such
a finding Members werefree to react toshortages byundertakingnaional measures to secure theirown supplies which
could have a deleterious effect on the availability of supplies to other participants. Evans, supranote 40, at 1-3.
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Under the terms of the IEP,the decision to activate the emergency allocation system
would be left to the EA's Governing Board (which was composed of representatives of
the governments ofparticipating nations). One of the goals ofthe program was to obtain
advisory assistance from the oil industry via an International Advisory Board in order
to assess the world supply system properly as precondition to activating the allocation
system.'0 The IEA and the IEP represented a positive step toward realizing the
Commission's long-term agenda of creating a coordinated energy supply and research
system for the EEC. In fact, in 1977, in conjunction with the IEA, the EEC developed
a crisis machinery to deal with future energy shortages and enhance the possibility of
political and structural interdependence in the field of energy.
A. In Re The jEP
In order to enhance the proper functioning of the IEP with respect to EEC participants, the Commission soughtto integrate it into the legal frameworkoftheTreaty in case

the program was ever activated. The Commission's concern with legal integration was
set in motion in January, 1982, when, on behalf of the oil companies participating in the
emergency allocation system, it was asked to provide either negative clearance or exemption under Article 85(3) of the Treaty."6
According to the Commission, a proper response necessitated inquiry into the struc-

tural interplay between Article 85(1) and 85(3) ofthe Treaty which set forth the rules of
competition with respect to undertakings. Article 85(1) prohibited "all agreements

between undertakings, decisions by associations ofundetakings and concerted practices
which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect
the prevention or distortion of competition within the common market. ... "
Article 85(1) applied particularly to those undertaking which were in a position to "limit

or control production, markets, technical development or investment.""1e

Analytically, the Commission recognized that both reporting and non-reporting
international oil companies were undertakings pursuant to Article 85(1). Yet, there
remained the unanswered question as to whether companies cooperating within the
framework of the IEP's emergency allocation system represented a concerted practice
which would have the effect of distorting competition in violation of Article 85(1).

'In its 1983 Notice, the Commission looked favorably upon oil company participation
in the allocation and invited
"interested ir parties"fortheircomments and observations on theematter. Re TheInternationalEaergyProgramme,
supra note 104, at 93-96;, see also Evans, supra note 40, at 2-4.
'Van der Linde & Lefeber, supra note 102, at 13-18.
101
EEC TREATY art. 85, reprinted in BAsIc COMMUNrrY LAWS, supra note 31, at 51.
1
mJd.
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As a preliminary matter, the Commission determined that the cooperative nature of
the companies' activities under the IEP appeared to be concerted in nature-" 9 In fact, the
activation of the allocation system meant that, in some cases, oil would be directed to
destinations it would not otherwise have gone had there been no activation. Hence, one
could infer that "the usual market processes" could be set aside "in order to bring about
results different from those which unrestricted competition would bring about in a
supply shortfall."110 This could lead to a distortion of normal market conditions. The
Commission was concerned that concerted activity by the oil companies with respect to
the allocation and redistribution of oil supplies would not only affect "transactions
across frontiers," but also intra-Community trade itself."'
Yet, the Commission also knew that if Article 85(1) were to govern, it could have
a restrictive effect upon the LEP as well as upon the proper allocation of oil supplies in
the EEC itself in the event of an emergency. Hence, it looked for a way to get around
the strictures inherentinArticle 85(1). It found one in thelanguage ofArticle 85(3) which
negates the application of subsection (1) under certain conditions. According to Article

85(3),
The provisions of paragraph 1 may... be declared inapplicable in the case
of:
-any agreementorcategoryofagremnentsbetweenundertakings;
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of
undertakings;
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices
whichcontributestoimprovingtheproductionanddistributionof
goods orto promoting technical or economic progress, while
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit....1
The Commission concluded that subsection (3) could be invoked because the activation of the emergency allocation system would enhance the proper distribution of
supply and provide consumers with a fair share ofthe resulting benefit. Moreover, under
Subsection (3)(b), competition with respect to a substantial portion of the products in
question would not be eliminated."3 Pursuant to Article 85(3), the Commission decided
that the provisions ofArticle 85(1) would be declared inapplicable to concerted practices
"IJn re int'l Energy Programme, 2 C.M. LR. 193 (1984).
1wid. at 194.
"I d.
2
1 EEC TREATY art. 85, reprinted in BASIC COMMUNrrY LAWS, supra note 31, at 51.
3
1 In re Int'l Energy Programme, 2. C.M. LR. at 195.
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between all oil companies involved in carrying out the IEP's emergency allocation
system; and declared that its decision was effective until December 31, 1993.114
The Commission's conclusion was predicated upon the undedying rationale that
Article 85(3) afforded a legal means to suspend the rules governing free competition in
order to deal with a future crisis while at the same time preserving the integrity of the
Treaty. 15 Equally significant, the Commission's decision in Re The IEP was evidence

ofgrowth in Community political and juridical authority. Some thirty-two international

oil companies had applied to the Commission to obtain legal relief in order to comply
with the rules subsuming the emergency allocation system. Such conduct helped to
reinforce the system's structural linkage to Community policy initiatives in the area of
energy distribution and supply. Had the companies not applied to the Commission for
legal relief, it would have indicated that the entire system was fundamentally an institutional house of cards.
B. Beyond the Washington Conference: EEC Energy Initiatives
The creationofthe IEA helped to engenderahostof Commission recommendations
that led to the Council Resolution of 17 September 1974 "concerning a new energy
strategy for the Community." 1 6 The new strategy involved: 1) collective efforts at a
rational reduction of internal consumption; 2) the improvement of supply security by
developing nuclear energy, hydrocarbon, and solid fuel resources; and 3) a Community
research and technology program to develop energy resources for the Member States." 7
The Resolution not only was an effort to show that the Council had the "political
will"to undertake the drafting and implementation ofa Community energy policy, it also
demonstrated that such a policy necessitated the "close coordination of positions of
Member States of the Community which will enable it to express a common viewpoint
on energy problems vis 4 vis the outside world.""' By its nature, the formulation of
energy policy would have to be linked to political cooperation and foreign policy coordination among the Member States. The importance of such a linkage was acknowledged
by the Heads of State at the Paris meeting in December

'141d. at 197-99.
"In this context, inRe United Reprocessors GmbH, 2 C.M. LR. Dl, D8 (1976), the Cmmission noted that'under
Article 85(3), the provisions of Article 85(1) may be declared inapplicable to any agreement which contributes to
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical and economic progress while allowing
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit...." Id.
"'See Council Resolution of September 17, 1974; OJ. (C 153/1); 9.7.75.
"'Id.at 153/2.
"'Id. at 153/1.
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Following the Resolution in September, and the Paris meeting in December, the
Council passed its Resolutions of 17 December 1974 concerning setting energy policy

objectives for 1985 and the rational utilization of energy supplies.119 These Resolutions
reminded the Community of the need for (1)an effective conjunctural policy that would
align national policies with Community policy; and (2) a rational reduction in internal
consumption as well as a rational utilization ofenergy resources.12° Unfommately, there
was nothing substantive in the Resolutions concerning how these objectives were to be
realized and enforced.

Like pre- 1973 Resolutions, Directives, and Decisions, the guidelines and objectives
of 1974 remained broad statements of principle and were non-committal about how the
new program would be implemented. Quite telling is the statement in the December
Resolution pertaining to 1985 policy objectives which blandly proffered: "Whereas it
should be possible to apply coherent guidelines to the various energy resources of the
Community while complying with the Treaties. '1 '2 All too often, measures merely
announced that implementation of an energy policy was an objective that the Community had set for itself.12 "Such proclamations reflect the essence of the problem; the
responsibility for common action is a self-assumed and not a treaty designated task."3
It also revealed that Community authority was still a pawn of centrifugal forces within
the more powerful Member States especially.
Despite these shortcomings, one can discern a greater attention to the regulation of
energy issues. Such attention led to a number of legislative initiatives between 19751977 which helped promote Community self-confidence to prceed with building a
viable energy regulatory structure. Forexample, pursuant to the conjunctural policy goal
inherent inArticle 103, the Council Directive of May 20,1975 obligated Member States
to maintain minimum stocks of fossil fuel at thermal stations to ensure the security of
supplies for 30 days in the event of an unexpected crisis such as that of 1 9 7 3 .n1 Shortly
thereafter, the Council moved underArticle 235 (which provides alegal means for filling
lacunae in the Treaty) to implement an energy research and development program. This
program included a specific expenditure limit to finance solar and geothermal energy
projects and energy conservation. 5
'"See Coumcil Resolutions of Dec. 17, 1974, OJ. (C 153/2) 2,5 respectively; 9.7.75.
n0 See Council Resolution of February 13, 1975 concerning measures to be implemented to achieve the policy
objectives adopted by the Council on December 17, 1974, OJ. No. C153/6; 9.7.75; and Council Resolution of June
26, 1975 which seta short term target for oil consumption reduction, OJ. No. C 153/9, 9.7.75.
- OJ. (C 153/3).
- C. Council Directive of Feb. 13, 1975, 1975 OJ. (L 178i24).
w Grean, supra note 20, at 53.
OJ. (75/339) L 153/35 (1975).
-Cf. Council Decision of 22August 1975 (751510), OJ.No. L231/1-5. (This would be am nded by Decision 77/
54 OJ. L 1=f2&) See also Council Decision of 25 August 1975 which dealt with solar energy. and recycling Of raw

materials, includinga call for sudie on biological conversion. OJ. No. L231-25 (1975). See EEC TREATY art. 235,
reprinted in BASIC CoMMUNTY LAWS, supra note 3 1,at 107.
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Moreover, the Council adopted regulations to establish procedures by which Member States could communicate their energy situation to the Commission. I provided the
Commission with the authority to determine more effectively the conditions of supply
within Member States as well as procedures to obtain a) information on crude oil and
petroleum prices pursuant to Articles 1,2,5, and 213; and b) information on investment
projects in the petroleum and electricity sectors" 26
In essence, the Commission had begun to acquire important oversight powers crucial to the development and implementation of a Community energy policy. And by
having access to the IEP as well, the Community had, by 1977, begun to lay the foundation for a structure that could house (1) an emergency energy allocation and reserve
system; (2) consumption and reduction targets; and (3)Community funded research and
development programs. Yet, tensions over how to build a solid legal edifice in energy
beganto surface in the late 1970's with anumberof disconcerting decisions by European
Court of Justice involving oil policy.
VI. LEGAL STRATEGIES AT LOGGERHEADS:
FISSURES IN THE COMMUNITY EDIFACE
A. The Problem of Restrictive Practicesin the Wake of the 1973 War

(1) Aardolie Belangen Gemeenschap BV v. Esso Nederland BV (Before The Commission - 77/327)

In November of 1973, in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, many oil producing
countries began to limit petroleum production. Their decision set in motion a crisis in
the international oil market by disrupting the supply-demand equilibrium with respect
to petroleum products.'" The crisis was particularly acute in the Netherlands where the
embargo on shipments of crude oil to Rotterdam in December, 1973 created a drastic
reduction in supplies availableY"
On January 4,1974, the Commission received an application from the Dutch company Aardolie Gemeenschap BV ("ABG") to initiate proceedings'" against several oil
companies. These included three Dutch companies which were wholly-owned subsidiaries of the British Petroleum Company (collectively denominated as "Bl). ABG
eg., Council Directive 75/339,1975 OJ. (L 135/5); Coumcil Regulation 1729f76, 1976 OJ. (L 198/1).
Aardolie Belangen Gemeenschap BV v. Esso Nedcdand BV 2 C.Mi.LR. DI, D3 (1977). See also Evans, supra
note 23, at 384.
'Aardolie Belanger Genenschap BV, 2 C.M.L& at D3.
'"The proceedings were also brought by Avia Nederland CV. Aardolie apparently functioned as a purchasing
cooperative for the 19 member AVIA group in the Netherlands. See the discussion of the Advocate General JeanPieWarnerin Befleen Petrmn Handel smaatschappig BV, BritishPetroleumRaffinaderizNederlad NVand
British Petroleum Maatshappig Nederland v. E.C. Commission, 3 C.M.LR. 174,177 (1978). The BP case will be
discussed laer in this section.
'See,
m
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°
contended that the companies had violated Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty." During
the twelve months before the crisis, BP had served as ABG's principal supplier of crude
petroleum; a product critical to the Dutch motor fuel market. According to Commission
during this
findings, BP accounted for an average of 81% ofABG's supply requirements
13
period and literally 100% during the October War period itself. 1

Beginning in November, 1973, there was a radical change in the origin and quantities of products supplied to ABG. During the crisis, the Dutch government called for
a reduction of 15-20% inconsumptionintheNetherlands.?3 BPcut its supplies ofmotor
fuel to ABG even more. In fact, the Commission found that BP reduced delivery to ABG
at percentages far greater than those to other customers. For example, Commission
statistics revealed that in November, BP increased its supply to other customers 42%
while reducing ABG's by 60.9%. This enormous disparity continued until April, 1974.
Despite efforts to purchase its supply elsewhere, ABG had difficulty obtaining supply
and could not make up its requirements. 33 The Commission found that during the crisis
"ABG's stocks fell to1 3the equivalent of three days' supply and, at certain times, were
simply non-existent.
The Commission's factual findings triggered an inquiry into whether the BP group
violated Article 86 of the Trea. Under Article 86: "Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it
shall be prohibited as incompatible withthe commonmarket insofar as itmay affeettrade
between Member States."'
The Commission argued that firms hold a dominant position in the marketplace
when they can conduct their affairs without concern for the reactions of either their
competitors or their customers. Such a state of affairs obtains when "general economic

circumstances and particular market conditions combine so that firms with an established market position... find themselves in a position to control production and
distribution in a substantial proportion of the market." 13'

'"Aardolie Belangen Gemeenschap B' 2 C.M.LR. at D3.
"'The Commission fact-finder deternined that imports had fallen by 50%other Octoberlevel Id. Gulf supplied
8% and Shell, Chevron, and others supplied the rest. Id. at D9-10. In this regard, for a discussion on ABG's longterm ontiractual relations with BP. see id. at D8-9.
tIod. at D10.
utppaid ABG in the yearpriortothe fisis. BP's supplies fell drastically
mln this regard, there werefour refiners
between November, 1973 -Mardh, 1974. Gulf's supplies alsodedined considerably between January -March, 1974
overits priormonthly average. Shell and C2hevron. however, increased the upply toABG between January-Mardh,

1974. Id. at D10-13.
"'idat D12.
m EEC TREATY art. 86, reprined in BAsic CoMMUNrrY LAWS, ulPra note 31, at 51-52.
'Aadolie Belangen Gemeenschap BV, 2 C.M.LR. at D13.
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Analytically, the market in question was the motor fuel maiket The general economic circumstances were those set in motion around November 1, 1973 when
the
supply of oil on the world market combined with a substantial increase in the
price
demanded for such supply. Given the special relationship that large multi-national
oil
companies had with Middle Eastern oil producing states, they were the only ones
with
"access to oil supplies at economically viable prices .... ,,1 The
Commission concluded
that "[sluch a sudden shortage, especially one that was not brought about by economic
considerations, led to a restriction of both actual and potential competition among
the
small group of companies concerned, a restriction that was particularly marked
at
the
level of distribution."138 Hence, given the supply crisis in Holland in the fall of
1973,
companies such as the BP group were in a position to dominate competition, alter
the
structure ofcommercial relationships, and cause customers to be completely dependent
upon them.
In order for an undertaking to avoid being found to have violated Article 86, it "must
allocate any available quantities to its several buyers on an equitable basis." 39
Such
equity had not been the case in BP's dealings with ABG during the oil crisis. In fact,
its
supplies to ABG were cut disproportionately more than those to its other customers."4
In the Commission's view, while a crisis situation may cause changes in the normal
course of doing business, there must be objectively valid reasons for treating customers
differently and any differences could not have a discriminatory effect. "In any event,
it
is abusive to treat a regular long-standing and substantial customer in a way which
is
clearly discriminatory by comparison with other customers. '41
The Commission found that BP had abused its dominant position under Article 86
when it violated its continuous long-standing commercial relationship with ABG.
In so
finding, the Commission articulated a principle oflaw based upon the policy ofpreserving a Community-wide economic infrastructure. The stability of such an infrastructure
was itself predicated upon not only maintaining regular commercial relationships,
but
also avoiding capricious conduct that could upset the supply and demand equilibrium
to the detriment of intra-Community trade. Indeed,
[f]rom the Community law point of view, it is the extent, regularity and
continuity of commercial relationships which ought to be taken into consideration. If it were otherwise, the availability of supplies during a short-

117id.
'Ald.

Od. at D14.
140d. at DI5.
111id. atD16.
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age... could be influenced by firms which are in a dominant position for
reasons which may be casual, artificial or arbitrary.1
While it took more than three years to render a decision from the time of ABG's
application to initiate proceedings, the Commission's ruling represented a step forward
in the effort to develop an enforceable Community regulatory structure by applying
Community legal norms to a transnational crisis. It not only had the practical result of
assuring the regularity ofsupply during a crisis, it implicitly recognized that Community
law could be utilized to enhance a "Community idea." Article 86 could thus be invoked
to "require oil companies to maintain the unity of the Common Market in the face of
uncoordinated and disruptive national emergency measures."t 4 3
(2) BP v. Commission
BPmoved to have the decision annulled. It commenced proceedings underArticle
173 of the Treaty which permitted a corporate entity to request the ECJ to review the
t
the
legality of a Commission act or decision which affected it directly.1Disturbingly,
Court held that BP had not abused its dominant position within the meaning of Article
86. By annulling he Commission's decision, the Court caused a fissure to appear in the
walls of an already fragile Community juridical structure. Indeed, it gave a legal justification to deferring to national decision-making in times of crisis at the expense of the
Treaty's goal of encouraging competition in the marketplace.' "
The Court focused upon the conjunctural policies set forth in Article 103 of the
Treaty as the appropriate means to analyze future energy supply crises. In this context,
it is instructive to examine the dialectical interplay of arguments concerning the applicability ofArticles 86 and 103 of the Treaty as set forth in the opinions of the Advocate
General and the Court in order to realize that the holding was not a legal advance over
the result reached by the Commission.
The Advocate General admitted that he "would shrink from holding that BP's share
of the Dutch market for motor spirit was negligible."' " He conceded that while BP's
1421d. at DIS.
m Evans, supra note 40, at 10 (emphasis added).
BV, British Petroleum Raffinadenz Nederland NV and British
m Benzine en Petroleum Hand
Petrolemn Maatshappig Nederland v. E.C. Commission (BPv. Commission), 3 C.M.LR. 174,176 (1978) see also
Rudden and Wyatt, supra note 30, at 86-87. Concerning Article 173 procedure and its relationship to Article 177,
Bebr.DiredandndiretJdicialConftrolofCommniyActsinPractice: TheRelationBetweenArtices
seeGe
173 and 177 of the EEC Treaty, 82 MIChL L REV. 1229 (1984). The BP group was notified on April 25, 1977, and
commenced proceedings on July 1,1977. Under thethirdpargniph dAricle 173. a party plaintiff has two months
to insntute proceedings from the point of publication or notification, whichever is later. Hence, technically, while
BP was oat of rule, the issue is not addressed by the cornt. Id.
1 PARRY & HARDY, upra note 4, at 418.
IOBP v. Comunision, 3 C.MKL.R. at 184.
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share of the Community market may have been small, it was a substantial portion of the
Dutch market. Yet, he shifted the focus away from the consequences of such an interpretation by framing the question narrowly as follows: Did Article 86 apply "to a

situation in which owing to an emergency causing a temporary scarcity of supplies of

a particular commodity, the customers of the 'normal' customers of each supplier may
become dependent on him?"1' 47 Predictably, he answered his own question in the negative (otherwise there would have been no need to extend the inquiry given his
acknowledgement of the Commission's correct interpretation of Article 86).
The Advocate General opined that it was the function of the particular national
government to allocate and regulate supply in a crisis. Typically, two options were
available to governmental authorities: (1) not to intervene and let prices rise to the point
at which supply and demand are in balance; or (2) avoid this approach by controlling
price and supply distribution. He concluded that the Commission's view seemed to be
"that where there is a lacuna in whatever governmental measures may have been taken,
Article 86 may be invoked to fill iL"14
Yet, this was not the Commission's view. The Commission wanted to stop corporations from manipulating contract law inorderto dominate the marketplace. It specifically stated that "[u~ndertakings cannot avail themselves of criteria based on the law of
contract in order to prevent the realisation of the objectives of competition law in the
Community. ..."149 Contrary to the Advocate General's view, the Commission's
objective was to preserve one of the fundamental values of the Economic Community
- a free market guaranteed by Treaty law. It was not predicated upon a mechanistic
methodology of waiting to see whether governmental regulatory decisions left lacunae
and then using Community law to fill them.
Accordingto theAdvocate General, a dominant position underArticle 86 meant that
an undertaking had to be in a position of such economic power so as to be able to act
independently ofitscustomers and competitors. Then, in disregard ofthe Commission's
factual findings, and the legal implications flowing therefrom, he reached the following
opaque conclusion to support his contention that Article 86 was inapposite:
In a temporary emergency of the kind here in question,. . a trader cannot
distribute his scarce supplies regardless of the attitudes of his customers.
He must have in mind that, once the emergency is over, they will have
memories of the way in which they were treated by him during the period
of scarcity. Contractual customers will expect favorable treatment to which
1471d.
'Old.
'PSee Aardolie Belangen Gemeensch

BV v. Esso Nederland BV, 2 CM.LR.DI, D15 (197"7.
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their contracts entitle them, both as a matter of law and as a matter of
commercial honor as BP pointed out. Non-contractual but regular customers will expect the loyalty shown by them... on the part of their supplier
in the period of scarcity. Asupplier can disregard those considerations only

at the peril of losing customers to his competitors after the emergency is
over. So I do not think that he is during the emergency, in a dominant
position in which that expression is used in Article 86.5
The Advocate General further concluded that the case was outside the ambit of
Article 86 and even argued that BP could take the position that (1) it had no legal or
commercial relationship with ABG obliging it to supply ABG during the boycott; and
(2) the burden of responsibility lay at the doorstep of the national authorities not at that
of the multi-nationals.ul He then made the astonishing logical leap that even if BP had
a dominant position, "it cannot be held to have abused that position."I
The Court agreed with the Advocate General that BPhad not violated Article 86. In
its view, ABG had been only an occasional customer.53 However, as Andrew Evans has
noted, "the Court, unlike the Advocate General, did not expressly reject the possibility
that an undertaking could in principle abuse its dominant position by applying unequal
reductions of supply during a shortage."' Yet, rather than sustaining the Commission's
decision to apply Article 86, the Court took a different tack. It reasoned that the imposition of a legal duty upon a supplier to apply a similar rate of reduction in deliveries to
its customers during a crisis, regardless of the existing contractual obligations in place,
obtained only via Article 103 of the Treaty; or, more troublingly, "in default of that, by
the national authorities." L
In this regard, Article 103 provides a legal basis for the coordination of Member
States' conjuncturalpolicies. Section (1), forexample, provides thatconjunctural policy
shall be regarded as "a matter of common concern;" and requires consultation among
Member States and with the Commission to determine what measures should be taken
under given circumstances. Section 3 allows the Council to issue the necessary directives to deal with a particular situation. Finally, and no doubt the key section for the
Court, Article 103(4) provides that "[t]he procedures provided for in this Article shall
also apply if any difficulty should arise in the supply of certain products."''
t"BP v. Conmissim, 3 C.M.L.R. at 186.
' BP had contended that Dircive 73/238 d July 24, 1973 made the national authorities, not the oil companies,
responaible for supply allocation and for taking the approprate measurs tomitigate the effects of shotages brought
on by a crisis. Id.
LOId. at188.
'Id. at 192.
"' Evans, supra note 40, at 10.
t.BP v Conmiuion, 3 C.ML.R. at 193.
1

EEC TREATY art. 103, reprinted in BASIC COMMUNITY LAWS, zupra note 31, at 59.
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With its conclusion that Article 103 offered the best means to resolve a product
supply problem, the Court basically accepted (1) BP's argument that the responsibility
for supply difficulties in a crisis should be placed at the doorstep of the Member State
governments and not the multi-nationals; and (2) the Advocate General's argument that
there was a regulatory lacuna to fill.
BP essentially had built its case upon Council Directive 73/238 of July 24, 1973,
which operated within the ambit of Article 103.L Article I directed that"Member States
shall take all necessary measures to provide the competent authorities with the necessary
powers in the event of difficulties arising in the supply of crude oil and petroleum
products which might appreciably reduce the supply of these products and cause severe

disruption."m
Despite this apparent focus on actions to be taken by national governments, the tenor
of the Directive is to take a Community-wide view within the coordinate framework of
the Treaty. Thus, in the preamble, for example, the Council acknowledged that any
difficulty, however temporary, which reduced supplies ofvital products, could seriously
disrupt the economic well-being of the Community itself. '"he Community must,
therefore, be in a position to offset or at least diminish any harmful effects in such a
case.' '" Indeed, Article 3 of the Directive provided that if difficulties arose, the Commission and Member States' representatives were to convene in order to begin coordinating measures in the Community interest'6 0
The Community interest meant taking all measures necessary to ensure the regularization and stabilizationofcrude oil and petroleum supplies. The Commission had noted
in its Decision that the Dutch Government had accepted the fact that during the crisis
period there might have to be a 20 percent per month supply reduction to customers in
comparison with the corresponding month of the preceding year. "But in so doing they
made no distinction between'contractual' and 'non-contractual' customers.' 6' The BP
group tried to capitalize on the crisis by drawing upon this lack of a formal distinction
to reap advantages while aware of the difficulties the national authorities were having
in trying to create discipline in the marketplace.
Under such circumstances, both conjunctural policy and competition in akey supply
sectorwereclealy affected. Infootnote 12 of its Opinion, the Courtnoted that conjunctural
was a non-English term which'"means roughly short-term economic."'6 In the Court's
-VSee 1973 OJ. (L 228/1).
'%Id.
L0id. at pmbl 1.

"'Id.at Ar. 3.
" Aardolie Belangen Gemeenschap BV v. Esso Nededand BV, 2 CALR. DI, D15 (1977).
1
BP v. Commission, 3 C.M.LR. 174, 190 n.12. (1978).
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view, rules involving common economic policy pursuant to Article 103 are distinguishable from the measures involving competition under Articles 85 and 86. Each sector
apparently had its own analytical sphere of reference.
Yet, the Court did not explain why. Apparently, it was predicated upon the fact that
Articles 85-86 fell beneath the rubric of Part Three Title I of the Treaty: "Common
Rules;" while Article 103 fell beneath the rubric of Part Three Title II: "Economic
Policy." Yet, problems and rules relating to competition in the market cannot be dissociated from common economic policy unless subjected to an excessive and unnecessary
formalism. Commercialpolicy, forexample, whichis withinthe sametitle as conjunctural
policy, is concerned with the impact it has upon competition among undertakings in the
Member States.163
Thus, except for such a formalism, there was really nothing to stand in the way of
application of Article 86 of the Treaty. As Andrew Evans has reCommission's
the
marked, the Commission already had experienced difficulties in trying to set further
measures enacted underArticle 103 with respect to raising the minimum level of reserve
stocks to 120 days. 1" What would happen if its efforts were hampered? The Court's
decision to limit matters to Article 103 hardly resolves such an eventuality.
Further, Directive 73/238, which was enacted pursuant to Article 103 in particular,
provided in the preamble that "the establishment of a common energy policy is one of
1
the objectives the Communities have set for itself." 6 This common energy policy was
formulated by the Commission in its 1968 Guidelines; the basic principles of which were
adopted by the Council in its May 18, 1972 Regulation.'" In the 1968 Guidelines, the
Commission stated:
Since the energy policy is intended to serve the consumers' interest, its
basic guiding factor must be competition. Competition forces enterprises
to exert all their competitive strength, compels them to become technically
progressive, stimulates the natural processes of substitution, and brings
with it a differentiation in supply. But even energy policy fundamentally
geared to competition cannot be implemented without the instruments of
economic policy enabling the interplay of supply and demand to be supervised and influenced more extensively than a large part of the other economic fields. 167
"See EEC TREATY arts. 85, 103, 109, reprinted in BASIC CoMMUNrrY LAWS, supra note 31, at 51,59,62.

'"Evans, supra note 40, at 10, 1978 OJ. (C. 15)3. See also Council Diretive 68/414,1968 OJ. (L 308/14) which
sets forth, in Article 1, a 65 day level.
1 1973 OJ. (L 228/1).
'"See Commission Regulation 1055fl2, 1972 OJ. SPEC. ED. 462 (L 120/3) 462.
"'First Guidelines for a Community Energy Policy, 12 Bull. of E.C. 7 (Supp. 1968).
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Hence, the objective of establishing a common energy policy, as set forth within an

Article 103 Directive, involved the coordinate integration of sectoral rules with respect
to competition and conjunctural policy. There was no lacuna to fill. The nascent
regulatory structure was in place and the Commission had approached the matter appropriately. Thus, the Court's decision undermined a common policy and created unnecessary tension in the Community decision-making apparatus by putting two key regulatory institutions at loggerheads. There was no contradiction in applying Article 86 to
Article 103. It is submitted that the proper application of the rules of competition to
conjunctural policy would not only have prevented legal formalism, it would also have
strengthened the crisis mechanism built into Article 103 of the Treaty.
B. BeyondBP v. Commission: The Road to the Campus Oiland Bulk Oil (Zug) Cases
The 1979-1980 market disturbances in the wake of the Iranian Revolution once
again revealed the EEC's vulnerability.168 While the spate of regulations in the mid1970's had led to important advances, no serious attempt at creating a centralized energy
decision-making mechanism had occurred. Thus, with renewed disturbances in the oil
market, the pattern of self-interested Member States seeking to secure their own supplies
recurred. In such a political climate, with its centrifugal implications for Community
cohesion, the Council's conductwas reminiscentof the pre- 1973 period. Itmade sweeping pronouncements about the need to harmonize national policies - but this time by
1990.69
In 1981, the Commission produced still another paper on the same troubled theme
- the need to develop a Community energy policy. The paper was entitled: "The
Development of an Energy Strategy forthe Community." The Commission held out the
hope that while Member State energy policies remained institutionally divergent, common interests might lead to common discipline. Hence, without saying so, the Commission implicitly acknowledged that Community institution building was still at the mercy
of Member State nationalism. Its broad policy goals and hopes had their "objective
correlative" in the area of European political cooperation in which attempts to conduct
a Euro-Arab dialogue, and discussions with Japan to coordinate energy policies, accomplished very little for the Community. 17°
The early 1980's did witness some positive developments; including Council decisions to grant subsidies for oil and gas projects and for the improvements of Community
'"Fourteenth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities (1980).
t61d. The Report noted that on June 9,1980, the Council had adopted a Resolution on Community energy
policy

objectives for 1990 and convergence of Member State policies. The Resolution moved for greater
energy savings

and reduction of oil imports. Id.
"See. c.,Allen,TheEuro-ArabDialogue,supra.BullofE.C6 1979,points I.1., 1.1.18,1.1.19,1.2.1,1.2.2,Bull.
of E.C. - 5 (1985). point 2.1.107, Bull of EC - 12 (1985) points 2.1.224, 2.1.228.
I Bull of F.C. - 10 (1985), point 2.1.138.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol27/iss3/2

30

Fishbane: Evolution of Energy Policy in the EEC

Winter/Spring. 1994]

EvowmoN OF E~moy Poucy IN Ttm EEC

storage facilities. 1 ' Equally significant, the IEA decided to set up a surveillance system
forimported oil products aimed atensuring that members of lEA opened up theirrmarkets
to them. The Commission agreed to operate a similar system for the EEC."
Nevertheless, the overall picture was one of continued institutional tension and
floundering. Forexample, in May, 1985, the Commission sent the Council another draft
resolution for common energy goals: this time with a 1995 target date. It called for the
efficient use of energy, less dependence on imported oil, and increasing the present share
3
of solid fuels in the Community market? In March of 1986, the Parliament issued its
Opinion on the draft resolution for 1995 and confronted the problem directly by deplor74
ing the fact that the objectives were not more ambitious or more precisely defined.
Moreover, ECJ decisions during the 1980's disturbingly provided legal arguments
which supported national energy policy decision-making. These decisions remain inhibitors to coordinate Community-wide action in energy policy. While the geopolitical
order has changed since the 1991 Gulf War and the fragmentation of OPEC, legal and
regulatory uncertainty in energy still remainlong- range challenges to Europeanpolitical
cooperation - despite the harmonization process underway since the passage of the
Single European Act in 1986. It is, therefore, appropriate that we turn next to these ECJ
decisions.
C. Campus Oil Ltd. v. Ministerfor Indusry andEnergy
On August 25, 1982, the Irish Minister for Industry and Energy issued an Order
pursuant to Section 2 of the Fuels (Control of Supplies) Act of 1971 (as amended in
1981). Section 2 gave the Government broad discretionary powers to regulate the
supply, distribution, and marketing of designated fuels if itbelieved that such action was
in the national interest. The purpose of the Order was to require each company
importing oil into Ireland to purchase a proportion of its requirements from the stateowned Irish National Petroleum Corporation (TNPC) whose refinery was located at
Whitegate in the County of Cork17 6
Prior to 1982, the refinery had been owned and operated by the Irish Refining
Company, Ltd. (IRC). IRC itself was owned by a consortium of four major multinational oil companies. By the mid-1970's, the consortium increasingly sought to
import its supplies from more cost-efficient refineries in Europe.'7 Given Ireland's
rJid. at point 2.1.139.
173BulL of E.C. 5 (1985), pint 2.1.106.
- BulL of E.C. 3 (1986), point 2.1.153.
See Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for Industry and Energy, I C.M.LR. 465, 466-67 (It. H.
113

. 1984)

Elid.

7
1 FmbarrMurphy, Case Law: The NationalCourls, 21 COMMON MKT. L REV. 741 (1984).
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dependency upon the consortium, the Government set up the INPC. The INPC's objective was to secure a proportion of the petroleum market inorder to enhance
the country's
oil industry economically." 8 In fact, between 1979 and 1981, the NPC
had concluded
contracts with foreign suppliers which provided the country with 10%
of its petroleum
79
supplies.1
In the summer of 1981, the consortium notified the Ministry of Industry
and Energy
that it would be more profitable forit to close the Whitegate Refinery.
The Government
determined that if the refinery closed, then suppliers of refined petroleum
products
would have to obtain their supplies abroad; primarily from the United
Kingdom.1W
Accordingly, through the INPC, it purchased the IRC's share capital and
decided to keep
the refinery open. The Government's decision, and the concomitant
cost incurred, led
to the August Order.'
As a result, several Irish traders in petroleum products moved to
challenge the
validity of the Order. They applied for injunctive relief in the Irish High
Court on the
grounds that the Order(a) represented the introductionofameasure having
anequivalent
effect; (b) distorted competition; and (c) represented an abuse of a dominant
in violation
of Articles 30, 31, 85, and 86 of the Treaty of Rome.
The Plaintiffis looked to ProcureurDu Roi v. Dassonville (1974) and
Officier van
Justitie v.Adriaan de Peijper(1976) in support of their Article 30 claims.
Dassonville
stood for the proposition that Member State trading rules that hindered
Community
trade, whether directly or indirectly, constituted measures having an equivalent
effect to
quantitative restrictions upon the importation of products.'9
The Court's holding in Dassonvilkwas re-emphasized two years later
in dePeijper.
In de Peijperthe ECJ had ruled that regulatory regimes that placed impediments
upon
intra-Community trade violated Article 30 of the Treaty.' 3 Specifically,
"'Theobjectives of the MIC are outlined in Justice Murphy's
Order to the Irish Supreme Court. See Campus Oil

Ltd. v. Minister for Industry and Energy, I C.M.LR. 479 (IrS.C.
1984).
"Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister of Industry and Energy,
3 C.M.LR. 544,549-50(1984).
'wid.at 550. See also Campu Oil, 1 C.M.LR. at 482-83. On the growth
British oil capacity and its
implication for
the EEC, see, e.g., Andrew Evans, UnitedKingdomNorth Sea OdiPolicy
and EEC Law, 7 EUR. L REV 355 (1982);
John Woodliffe, Privatisaion of the British National Oil Corporation
and the British Gas Corporation, 8 EUR. L

REV 133,135 (1983).

""See Campus Oil Ltd., 1 C.M.LR. at 483-84.

"Id. at 467-69;, see also Procure Du Roi v. Dassonville 2 C.M.L.R.
436 (1974). As David Keeling has recently
argued, in Dassonville, the ECJ gave "an extremely wide definition"
of the concept of measures having equivalent
effect to a quantitative restriction on imports. In fact, according
to Keeling, the breadth of the definition was amplified

intheVandeHaarandKavekadeMeerncases(Joinedcases 177 and 7 8
1 /82)"to the effect that even aslighthindrance

to imports would bring Article 30 into play." See David T. Keeling,
The FreeMovement of GoodsinEEC Law: Basic

PrinciplsandRecent Developments in the Case Law ofthe Court
ofJusticeof

the European Communities, 26 INT'L
LAW. 467,468 (1992).
'WCase 104175, Officier van Justitie v. Adrian de Peijper 2 C.M.LR.
271,304 (1976)
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National measures of the kind in question have an effect equivalent to a
quantitative restriction and are prohibited under Article 30 of the Treaty if
they are likely to constitute an obstacle directly or indirectly, actually or
potentially, to imports between Member-States. Rules or practices which
result in imports being channelled in such a way that only certain traders can
effectthese imports, whereas others are prevented from doing so, constitute
such an obstacle to imports.18 4
The Plaintiffs further contended, correctly in this writer's view, that a state run
corporation that controlled 35% of the supply of the national petroleum market pursuant
to a mandatory regime engineered by the State, not only restricted and distorted the
market in violation of Article 85,but also abused the dominant position it had garnered
for itself in violation of Article 86.185
The Defendants argued against injunctive relief on the grounds that the Ministry's
Orderwas aprotectable public security measure underArticle 36. Given the importance
of petroleum for the national economy, the Order was essential for national economic
security and the preservation of public services. The Irish Governmen thus tried to bring
economic policy and the regulation of the distribution of petroleum supply and related
services within the ambit of the rather amorphous public security language set forth in
Article 36.186
Justice Murphy refused to issue an injunction on the grounds that "the balance of
conveniece inthe present case favors withlxlding as against granting ofan injunction....
Nevertheless, he referred a number of questions to the ECJpursuant to Article 177 of the
Treaty of Rome. The Defendants objected and appealed his Order of Reference to the
Irish Supreme Court.
On February 25,1983, afterhearing the arguments of the parties, the Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal. It held: "It is a matter of Irish law that Article 177 confers upon
an Irish national judge an unfettered discretion to make a preliminary reference to the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) for an interpretation of the Treaty of Rome ....
Disregarding European law on the issue, and construing Irish law narrowly, the Court
opined that Article 177, by its nature, afforded a national judge unimpeded access to the
189
ECJ. Accordingly, it upheld the Order of Reference.
lu'd.

"Campus Oil Ud., 1 C.M.LR. at 469.
luld, at 468-69.

11Id. at 475.
'"Id. at 487; see also Bebr,supra note 144.
' Finbar Murphy has argued that the Supreme Court's argument is flawed since there is nothing within Article 177
that would prevent a reference order from being overruled He further opited that an appeal against reference was
compatible with Community law and the Supreme Court should not have dispensed so perfunctorily with that
dimension of the debate. See Murphy, Case Law, supra note 17. at 748-52.
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The Irish High Court asked the ECJ to respond to the following interlocking questions:
I. Are Articles 30 and 31 of the EEC Treaty to be interpreted as applying
to a system such as that established by the Fuels (Control of Supplies) Order
1982 insofar as that system requires importers ofoil products into a Member State of the European Economic Community (in this case Ireland) to
purchase from a state-owned oil refinery up to 35 per cent of their requirements of petroleum oils?
2. If the answer to the foregoing question is in the affirmative, are the
concepts of 'public policy' or 'public security' in Article 36 of the Treaty
aforesaid to be interpreted in relation to a system such as that established
by the 1982 Order so that:
(a) such a system as above-recited is exempt by Article 36 of
the Treaty from the provisions ofArticles 30 to 34 thereof, or
(b) such scheme is capable ofbeing so exempt in any circumstances and, if so, in what circumstances? 90
In his Opinion, Advocate General Slynn argued that the Irish Government's
assertion that Article 30 was designed to prevent conduct aimed at protecting
domestic
products over imports was too narrow a reading of the rule. 191 Rather, pursuant
to
ProcureurDuRoi v. Dassonville,the proper focus ofArticle 30 analysis was whether
the
measure in question was capable of hindering intra-Community trade, not what
in the
language of the regulation was discriminatory. 92
He rejected the suggestion that Rewe v. BundesmonopolverwaltungftirBranntwein
(1979), (the CassisdeDijon case), (a) recognized exceptions to Article 30independently
ofArticle 36; and (b) permitted hindering the movement ofgoods within the Community
when disparities between national laws relating to the marketing of products
were
ultimately necessary to effectuate commercial faimess and the protection of public
health.
According to the Government, Rewe could be extended to apply to national
oil refining
capacity given its profound linkage to the maintenance of fiscal and commercial
order.

9:

" Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister of Industry and Energy, 3 C.M.LR.
544, 552 (1984).
"Id. at 554-55. For a discussion of the tensions within Article 30 jurisprudence
generally, see KamielMorselmans,

Artice3O oft heEECTreatyandLegislationRelating toMarketCircwmstances:
TetoConsideraNewDefinition?,

28 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 115 (1991).
"' However, he notes that even if one approached ittextually, discrimination

was obtained since it compelled traders
to buy a percentage oftheir requirementsat prices fixed by the national goverrnent
Cf. Campus OULtd., 3 C.M.LR.
at 555.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol27/iss3/2

34

Fishbane: Evolution of Energy Policy in the EEC

Winter/Spring, 1994]

EVOLtmON OF ENEoY Poucy INTHE EEC

Mr. Slynn considered Rewe inapposite: "There is an extensive body of directives
and decisions made by the Community in respect of oil supply and the obstacles in
1 93
question do not simply result from disparities between national laws." He rejected the
idea that because oil was important to the national economy, a government could control
the sources of supply and regulate price. Thus, he answered the first question in the
affirmative. Article 30's prohibition on measures having an equivalent effect was applicable.
The way now stood open fordeciding whetherArticle 36 concepts of public security
and/or public policy exempted certain regulations from the prohibitions set forth in
Article 30. The Commission had argued that the Irish Governmenthad not demonstrated
any public security threat if products did not first go through the Whitegate refinery.
Indeed, there was considerable refining capacity within the Community itself. A refinery, in and of itself, does not prevent shortages. The Commission correctly maintained
that the solution of the problem was to "hold adequate stocks in accordance with obligationsunder Community directives supplemented bylong term contracts forthe supply
ofcrude oil which can perfectly well be refined in otherparts of the Common Market"11
In short, the institutional recognition and enforcement of the Community energy regulatory regime, and the social, economic, and political discipline that would obtain from
it, would strengthen the goals of Article 30 and prevent arbitrary recourse to Article 36
as a Treaty-based disguise for pursuing narrow nationalist policies and goals.
The Advocate General demurred from the Commission's opinion. Given the importance of petroleum to state stability, he considered recourse to Article 36 appropriate.
Analytically, recourse to policy security arguments should not serve as ameans to protect
an otherwise economic interesL In support of this proposition, he looked to DupharBV
v. The State of Netherlands(Case 238/82) (1985).19 Dupharinvolved an Order by the
Dutch government to reorganize the system of health benefits and medicinal preparations with respect to a national health insurance fund for certain categories of benefits
in order to correct the fund's mounting budget deficit.
The Dutch Government had advanced two arguments (that sound curiously parallel
to thatof the Irish Government in Campus Oil): (1) since it made a decision to safeguard
the quality of health based on objective considerations, the measure by its nature did not
involve a restriction on inter-state trade; (2) alternatively, even if the measure had an
effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction on pharmaceutical products, it was a
protectable public policy measure pursuant to Article 36 since its purpose was to protect
national health. I
mid. at 555. For a useful review of the Casis de Dijon lined cases, see Keeling, s&qra note 182, at 469-79.
'Camnpus Oil d., 3 C.M.LR. at 557.
MId. at 558.
I Duphar BV v. State d Netherlands, 1 C.ML.R. 256.276 (1985).
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The ECJ was not convinced. It ruled: "Article 36 relates to measures of a noneconomic nature. That provision cannot therefore justify a measure whose primary
objective is budgetary inasmuch as it is intended to reduce the operating costs of a
sickness insurance scheme."' 19
Yet, while the Advocate General nodded in agreement with Duphar, he proceeded
to argue that petroleum supply could trigger an Article 36 inquiry even though the Irish
Government's Orderhad economic and budgetary objectives in mind. What was operative under Article 36 analysis was a public security issue not a public policy one. "The
maintenance of essential oil supplies is in my view capable of falling within 'public
security' in that it is vital to the stability and cohesion of the life of the modem State."'"
Thus, if the Court found that there were non-economic factors which warranted the
Order, then the measure would not be precluded by Article 30 on the grounds of public
security pumant to Article 36.199 In essence, Mr. Slynr avoided taking a stand. One is
left in doubt about the legal and institutional strength of Community directives as well
as whether the Irish Government's Order really involved a public security question that
could not be cured by the existing regulatory regime."
In responding to the questions before it, the Court concluded that the purchasing
requirement established by the 1982 Order favored national production and inhibited the
purchase of petroleum products from producers located in other Member States. The
Order thus fell within the ambit of Article 30 which encompassed any measure which
hindered intra-Community trade; whether"directly or indirectly, actually or potentially.
...,21 Therefore, in principle, the Irish Government's action constituted a quantitative
restriction having an equivalent effect. Moreover, "[gloods cannot.., be considered
exempt from the application of that fundamental principle merely because they are of
particular importance for the life or the economy of a Member-State. ' 2°2
The question now remained whether the public policy/public security objectives of
Article 36 applied. The Commission had argued that Article 36 did not apply because
(1) the Community had already adopted rules to ensure petroleum supplies to MemberStates in the event of a crisis; and (2) the Irish Government's action was fundamentally
economic in nature and, therefore, precluded by Article 36.203
id.at 279.
'uCampus Oil Ltd., 3 C.M.LR. at 559.
'"Id.at 562. See also Peter Oliver, A Review of the Case Law of the Court ofJustice on
Articles 30 to 36 in 1984,
22 COMMON Mi. L.REV. 301, 310 (1985).
'Kamiel Mortelmans has also viewed the Advocate General's positim to be an ambiguous
one. See his review and
annotation of the case in Campus Oil Ltd. v. Ministerfor Industry and Energy, 21 COMMON
MKT. L REV. 687,703
(1984).
2'Campus Oil Ltd., 3 C.M.LR. at 566.
Id.
""Id.at 567-68.
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While the Court had opined that goods were not exempt from the prohibitions of
Article 30 even if they were "of particular importance for the life of the nation", it began
its inquiry into Article 36 by indicating that the Order might be justified if the supply of
petroleum products was "not sufficiently guaranteed by measures taken for that purpose
by the Community institutions."2'
The Court admitted that the Community had, in fact, taken precautionary measures
to deal with the supply of petroleum products in emergency situations. Moreover,
additional measures were in place within the framework of the IEA. Nevertheless,
[T]his does not mean that the Member-State concerned has an unconditional assurance that supplies will in any event be maintained at least as a
level sufficient to meet its minimum needs. In those circumstances, the
possibility for a Member-State to rely on Article 36 to justify appropriate
complementary measures at the national level cannot be excluded, even
where there exist Community rules on the matter."
The Court's Article 36 analysis thus began in the following rather contradictory
manner: (a) goods of particular importance for the life of the nation are not exempt from
the strictures of Article 30; but (b) goods of a particular importance for the life of the
nation are exempt from the strictures of Article 30, if the Court can somehow find that
Community rules are not sufficiently complete with respect thereto.
2
The Court looked to E.C. Commission v. Germany (1980) 0 to bolster its emerging
position that economic issues that affected the life of a nation could be placed outside the
reach of Article 30 if it found incomplete rle-making by Community institutions. E.C.
Commission v. Germanypermitted "national legislation to derogate from the principle
ofthe free movement of goods to the extent to which this is and remains justified in order
0
to achieve the objectives set out in the Article.'* 1

The Court admitted that underprevailing lawArticle 36 applied "to matters of anoneconomic nature;" and a Member-State could notplead economic difficulty to circumvent the free-flow of goods between Member-States. Yet, after contending that goods
2"'d. at 568.
wId. at 569.

2E.C. Commission v. Germany, I C.M.LR. 198 (1980).
wl Campus Oil Ljd., 3 C.M.L.R. at 569. This rule had previously been articulated in Carlo Tedeschi v. Denkavit
Commerciale, 1 C.M.LR. 1,18 (1978) and reiterated in Case 251fl8, Denkavit Futterminel Gmbtt v. Minister for
Emihrnmg, Lamdwirtschaft und Forsten des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 3 C.M.LR. 513 (1980). Yet, the Court's
to Dassonville,
argument adds unnecessary tension toArticle30jurisprudence. As David Keeling noted with respect
indireatpotentialhindrance
slight
a
causes
that
a
measure
even
theory,
in
least
"at
Van de Haar, andKaveka de Meern,

to trade between Member States offends against Article 30. Keeling. supra note 182. at 468.
2m Campul Oil Ltd.. 3 C.M.LR. at 570.
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of particular importance forthe life ofanation were not exempt from Article 30, the Court
held that the supply of petroleum was of such national importance that "the aim of
ensuring a minimum supply of petroleum products at all times is to be regarded as
transcending purely economic considerations and thus as capable of constituting an
objective covered by the concept of public security."
Hence, if a public security
justification can be established, then accompanying economic objectives will not barthe
application of Article 36.
The Court's conclusion is troubling. The Commission had shown that the Community had a considerable body of rules already in place to meet a crisis. And the Advocate
General also had acknowledged the existence of "an extensive body of directives and
decisions made by the Community in respect to oil supply" when he rejected the Irish
Government's argument that there were exceptions implied in Cassisde Dijon which
supported its position. Hence, the Court's decision not only undermined Article 30
jurisprudence, but also enhanced national authority at the expense of the Commission
at a time when judicial support for the regulatory structure was needed.
D. Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G. v. Sun InternationalLtd.
Subsequent to Campus Oil, in the case of Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G. v. Sun International
Ltd. (Case No. 174/84), the EJ (this time with Commission support) upheld the priority
of national energy policy over a Community agreement with a non-Member State. 0
Bulk Oil originated in the English High Court and was referred to the ECQ pursuant to
Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome. The pertinent facts of the case are as follows. 21'
On April 13, 1981, Sun Oil Trading Company ("Sun"), a company incorporated in
both Bermuda and the United States, entered into an agreement with the Swiss company
Bulk Oil (Zug) AG ("Bulk") to provide it with large quantities of British crude oil from
the North Sea. Sun's supplier was the British Petroleum Company ("BP"). Bulk entered
into the contract with Sun in order to a supply oil to Israel which was suffering from an
acute shortage due to the Arab boycott and the loss of supplies from Iran in the wake of
the Iranian revolution and the overthrow of the Shah.212
The contract contained the following clause: "Destination free but always in line
with the exporting country's Government policy. '21 3 When Sun learned that Bulk had
named Israel as the destination point, BP and Sun refused to load the ship nominated by

201d.
2W rd.
2

n Case 174/84, Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G. v. Sun Int'l Ltd. and Sun Oil Trading Co., 2 C.ML.R. 732 (1986).
1d. at 735-36,753.
2
1Id.at 736.
212
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oil policy.
Bulk for delivery to Haifa on the grounds that Bulk was in violation of British
"

Thus, no oil was ever delivered to Israel under the Sun-Bulk contract-'

Since January, 1979, British policy only permitted exportation of its North Sea oil
to (a) Member-States of the Community; (b) Member-States of the TEA; and (c) those
countries with which there had been an existing pattern of trade prior to 1979.21f While
the policy was made known to the public, it was never incorporated into any legislation
or legally binding form. However, the British Government did document the policy for
the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) of the Member States of the
Community.2 6 Sensitive to the politics ofoiin an era of boycotts and a destabilized Iran,
the British Government adopted a policy that precluded oil sales to Israel.
Bulk challenged the validity of the policy and claimed that the contracting parties

knew Israel was the point of destination for the oil. The dispute was referred to arbitra-

of
tion. 2 7 The arbitrator found that Bulk's insistence on naming Haifa as the port
21
damages.
Sun
awarded
and
contract
the
of
destination constituted a repudiation
Bulk appealed the arbitrator's findings to the English High Court which upheld the
arbitrator. Relying on the principles contained inthe classic case ofHadley v. Baxendale
(1854), it reasoned that it was foreseeable that damage would arise from the natural
21 9
course of things when Bulk breached the destination clause. Curiously, neither the

arbitrator nor the High Court queried whether BP or Sun had a duty to inquire into the

content of the policy and notify Bulk accordingly at the time that they entered into a
supply agreement.

In addition to challenging the finding of damages under English law, Bulk sought
an order of reference to the ECJ pursuantto Article 177 of the Treaty.= It argued that
the order was necessary to determine whether English policy was in conformity with the
EEC-Israel commercial trade agreement entered into on May 11, 1975 and formally
adopted by the Community pursuant to Council Regulation No. 1274/75 on May 20,
1975.P1 The Court agreed. It referred several questions to the ECJ which may be
summed up broadly as follows: (1) Did the 1975 agreement preclude quantitative
restrictions on English exports to Israel and would any answer to the question be affected
by Regulation 2603/69?; (2) Was English policy incompatible with the EEC Treaty or
214

d at 736.
151d. at 736,753.

2

2"Id. at 752-53.
2
"Id. at 753.
2
"Id. at 736,753.
2hid.
2" Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G. v. Sun Int'l Ld., 2 C.M.LR. 91, 109 (1984
- BuLk Oil (Z- 8 ) A.G., 2 C.M.L.R. at 736,753-54.
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at least should England have notified the Community and/or obtained its approval prior
to placing such strictures on the contract?; and (3) If English policy was incompatible
with the Treaty, do the relevant provisions have direct effect so as to allow an individual
to rely on them at all; including as against another individual to a contract when such
contract requires compliance with the national policy of a Member State?'
The purpose of the 1975 EEC-Israel Agreement was to consolidate and extend the
agreement previously concluded between them in 1964 and 1970 respectively.223 The
parties resolved "to continue the progressive elimination of the obstacles to substantially
all their trade... and to establish cooperation between the Contracting Parties on a basis
ofmutual advantage. 2 4 Article I reiterated the goal of removing trade barriers between
Israel and the EEC as a collective entity. This raised the twin issues of whether with the
Agreement the EEC preempted the field of commercial relations with Israel; or whether
there were excepted areas left open to Member State competence. Both the Advocate
General and the ECJ decided that EEC did not take over the whole field of trade with
Israel with respect to the Agreement and that a Member State could impose product
restrictions.225
The Court focused its inquiry upon Articles 3, 4, 11, 12, and 25 of the Agreement.
In this regard, Article 3 precluded the introduction of (a) any new customs duty
on
imports or charges having an equivalent effect; or (b) any quantitative restriction
on
imports or measure having an equivalent effect in trade between the EEC and Israel.
Article 4 precluded the introduction of any new customs duty on exports or charges
having an equivalent effect.?
Article 11 provided that restrictions on imports or exports werejustified on grounds
of public morality, policy, or security as long as they did not constitute "a disguised
restriction on trade between the Contracting Parties."
Under Article 12, actions of
states or undertakings that restricted competition were deemed incompatible with the
Agreement "insofar as they affect trade between the Community and Israel.'n Finally,
Article 25 contained a catch-all provision: "The Contracting Parties shall refrain from
any measure likely to jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the Agreement.' 9
The ECJ admitted that a policy whose objective was to impose quantitative restrictions on exports to a non-Member State must be viewed as having an effect equivalent
IId. at 754. See also Council Regulation 1274/75, OJ. (L 136/1).
-Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G., 2 C.M.LR1 at 754-55.
DId. at 756.
1975 OJ. (L 136f3).
-See Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G., 2 C.M.LR. at 732.
'ld. at 756-57; see also 1975 O.J. (L 136) 4,5.
-Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G., 2 C.M.LR. at 756; 1975 OJ. (136/5).
-Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G., 2 C.M.LR. at 756; 1975 OJ. (13617).
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to such a restriction. The fact that the policy had not been incorporated into decisions
binding on undertakings did not mean that it could escape the prohibitions set forth in
Community law.2 ° Nevertheless, the Court found that British policy toward Israel did
not violate Community law.
In arriving at its holding, the ECJ focused narrowly on Article 4. It reasoned that
Article 4 contained no language expressly prohibiting quantitative restrictions or measures having an equivalent effect on exports similar to that for imports as set forth in
Article 3.I Moreover, "it cannot be inferred from Article 11, ambiguous though it may

be, that a clause prohibiting quantitative restrictions on exports should be understood to

have been intended by the Contracting Parties.' '2- Further, because Article 3 did not
expressly proscribe export restrictions, it followed that "the argument that the Agreement deprived the Member States of their power to introduce such restrictions must be
rejected, and the question of whether measures imposing quantitative restrictions on
exports are compatible with Articles 11, 12, and 25(1) of the EEC-Israel Agreement is
irrelevant.' ' 2-

The Court's reasoning is quite baffling. Article 11, for example, provided that while
quantitative restrictions and measures having an equivalent effect on exports could be
justified on grounds of public security, they should not serve as a means for arbitrary
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between the parties . 3 Nowhere is it
argued that the English Government's refusal to export oil to Israel was a public security
measure. And even if it were, it would not just reflect the narrowly targeted discriminatory nature of the measure. It would also constitute a disguised means of acquiescing

in an international boycott against a country with which the Community had concluded
an international agreement in conformity with its common commercial policy in the area
of external relations. Accordingly, the policy would be contrary to both Articles 12 and

25(l).
For the Court, like for the Advocate General, once it had been concluded that no
formal restricting language obtained inArticle 4parallel to Article 3,thenthe substantive
implications of Articles 11, 12, and 25 could be declared irrelevant and the problem of
competence declared resolved.m However, the implications of Article 2 of the Agreement was side-stepped. Article 2(2) provides that"Products originating in the Community shall on importation into Israel be governed by the provisions of Protocol 2.'"
-Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G., 2 C.M.LR. at 756-57.
= Id. at 756-57.
m1d.at 757.
2m id. at 757.
- 1975 OJ. (L 136)4,5.
"Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G., 2 C.M.LR. at 757.

1975 OJ. (L 13613).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1994

41

Akron Law Review, Vol. 27 [1994], Iss. 3, Art. 2

AKRON LAW REviEw

[Vol. 27:3,4

Article 5 of Protocol 2 provided for the abolition of quantitative restrictions on
imports into Israel.' Thus, even assuming arguendo thatquantitative restrictions on the
product in dispute were subject to progressive abolition, the imposition of any restriction
by a Member state would fall within the exclusive competence of the EEC for review.
What is equally troubling is that the Court's conclusion implicitly accepted the
premise ofBritish policy that the government could reserve the right to export oil to those
thirdcountries with whichithad a"pattem oftrade"priorto 1979 in spite of the existence
of a pattern of trade (established by formal agreement) between the EEC and Israel.
Thus, the Court sanctioned the priority of national trade policy over Community commercial policy; thereby granting a Member State parallel powers in an area that fell

within the Community's exclusive competence.

Yet, the Court asserted that British policy did not fall within the exclusive competence of the Community. It reasoned that Regulation 2603/69 excluded products listed
in its Annex, such as crude oil, from the rules pertaining to freedom of export until such
time as common rules had been introduced by the Council during the transition period.
"It must therefore be held, as Sun, the United Kingdom and the Commission have
argued, that Article 10 of Regulation No. 2603/69 and the annex to that regulation
constitute a specific authorization permitting Member States to impose quantitative
restrictions on exports of oil .... "1
Does Article 10 of Regulation No. 2603/69 provide such an authorization? To be
sure, it provides that "the principle of freedom of export from the Community as laid
down in Article 1 shall not apply to those products" listed in the Annex. 9 However,
Article 10 must be read in context.
Under Article 1, exportation of products from the EEC shall be free unless subject
to restrictions "which are applied in conformity with the provisions of this Regulation.'*40 Article 2, whichis subsumed beneaththe rubric ofTitle II, which itselfcategorically encompasses "Community information and consultation procedure," states: "If,
as a result of any unusual developments on the market, a Member State considers that
protective measures within the meaning of Title Em might be necessary, it shall notify the
Commission, which shall advise the other Member State."'24'
Title I outlines protective measures that might be considered. Article 6(1) pertains
to critical product shortages and subsection of that article allows for measures involving
mid. at 27.
-Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G., 2 C.M.LR. at 760.
-Council Regulation 2603/69 of 20 Dec., 1969,1969 OJ. (L 324/25) 593.
2Id. at 591.
ul d.
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exports to certain countries. Thus, Article 10, is not acarteblanchefora MemberState
to pick and choose upon which countries it wishes to impose quantitative restrictions
from the products listed in the Annex. It must be read integrally with Titles H and ImI
which involve an information and consultation procedure forcritical product areas as set
forth in the Annex. Following the Court's rationale, a Member State could control the
export of vital products to those countries it deemed politically and economically expedient to do so regardless of whether its decisions collided with internationally binding
commitments made by the EEC in conformity with the common commercial policy.
As E. M. V6lkerhas noted, such a broad interpretationis puzzling in light of the fact
that Regulation 2603/69 was amended by Regulation 1934/82. 'The amendment now
clealy states that only certain Member States were supposed to apply export quotas for
certainproducts mentioned in annex. Crude oil and certainpetroleum products and gases
3
were taken out of the annex and included in Article 10 itself as amended.'*
The principle of limiting freedom of export with respect to previously annexed
products, such as crude oil, would not apply to all Member States "in view of the... of
the international commitments entered into by certain Member States."2" The Court
construed this to mean that "all the Member States, whether or not they have restricted
exports ofoilin the past, are free to do so and were already free to do so under Regulation
Such a construction is unsettling and strtches the meaning of the
No. 2603/69.'
amended Regulation beyond recognition.
Regulation 1934/82 limited freedom of export of crude oil to those countries, such
that previously had entered into international contracts and which had to be
France,
as
honored. Neither Sun nor the British Government proffered any argument that the
refusalto export oilto Israel was a function ofhonoringpriorintemational commitments.
In essence, the Court's decision (this time with support from the Commission) ratified
national policy at the expense of the Community's regulatory regime.
Moreover, the Court implicitly acknowledged the politicization of oil as well as the
need to safeguard a national policy that fundamentally accepted the boycott of Israel in
the area of petroleum products so that existing relationships in a destabilized marketplace could be preserved in the wake of the Iranian revolution and the outbreak of war
between the regimes of Khomeini and Saddam Hussein. Thus, it deferred to national

-Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G., 2 C.M.LR. at 760-61.
a E. M. V1ker, Cast Law: Bulk Oil (Z)A.G. v. SunIntemationalL& A Sun Ol Trading Company, 24 COMMON
MKT. L REv. 99, 108 (1987).
2
" Id. at 109; see also Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G., 2 C.M.LR. at 759, 761.
2dBulk Oil Zug) A.G., 2 C.M.LR. at 759.
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decision-making at the expense of Community regulatory structures and unwittingly
encouraged the very centrifugal forces it (and the Commission) had sought to overcome.
At further issue was whether British oil export policy toward Israel violated the
principles of the Community's common commercial policy (and implicitly its external
relations power) as set forth in Articles 113-116 of the Treaty.2" The Court recognized
that in an area covered by the Common commercial policy, Member States could not
share concurrent authority with the Community. Otherwise, Member States could adopt
policies at loggerheads with that of the Community. This, in turn, would "distort the
institutional framework, call into question the mutual trust within the Community, and
prevent the latter from fulfilling its task in the defense of the common interesL' This
principal ofacknowledging Community competence in the common commercial policy
was predicated, significantly, upon an ECJ opinion rendered only a few months after the
EEC concluded its agreement with the state of Israel.2
The Court reinforced this view by looking to the principle set forth in Donckerwolke
v. Procureurde la Rpublique(Case No. 41/176) that since Article 113 gave the Commu-

nity exclusive competence in the area of the common commercial policy, national

measures affecting such policy were permissible at the end ofthe transitional period only
by virtue of specific Community authorization. 9 Moreover, the Court acknowledged
that "the fact that a product may have a political importance by reason of the building-

up of security stocks is not a reason for excluding that product from the domain of the
common commercial policy.'*°

Yet, the Court then claimed that this latter principle could be discounted since it was
predicated upon an EQ Opinion which "was concerned only with the principle of
general exclusion... of certain products from the field of application of the common
commercial policy...."5 As if the Court had a preconceived result in mind, it ignored
Regulation No. 1934/82 and returned to Regulation No. 2603/69 as providing specific
authorization for Member States to impose quantitative restricts on oil to non-Member
States. Given the circularity of its logic, it could then conclude:
Having regard to the discretion which it enjoys in an economic matter of
such complexity, inthis case the Council could, without contraveningArticle
113, provisionally exclude a product such as oil from the common rules on

2

Id. at 757-61.
11d. at 759-60.
'Old.at 759.
20ld.at 760.
0id
21Id. at 760-61.
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exports to non-member countries, in view in particular of the international
commitments entered into by certain Member States and taking into account the particular characteristics of that product, which is of vital importance for the economy of a State and for the functioning of its institutions
and public services.252
Having reached this result, it is not surprising that the Court would hold that British
policy (a) did not contravene Articles 34 and 85 of the Treaty; and (b) no prior notice to
or authorization from the Community was necessary.
The result reached by the Court was fraught with danger. It overfocused on the
loopholes inherent in Regulation 2603/69 at the expense of the internal competence of
the Community in the area of external relations as provided in Articles 112-115,238 of
the Treaty and related case law. In addition, it blithely ignored the implications of the
1982 amended version of the Regulation.
Articles 113 and 238 gave the Community the authority to negotiate and conclude
3
commercial agreements with non-Member states?5 This authority was evidenced by
the signing of a trade agreement between the Community and the State of Israel in 1975.
Moreover, under Article 115: "In case of urgency during the transitional period,
Member States may themselves take necessary measure and shall notify them to the
other Member States and to the Commission, which may decide that the States con4
cerned shall amend or abolish such measures.' 2 This is consistent with Titles H and III
of Regulation No. 2603/69. Given the international oil situation in January, 1979, one
would assume that the British decision to refuse to export its oil to Israel, in spite of an
existing Community agreement with that country, was predicated upon a sense of political and economic urgency. If one accepts such a premise, it would follow that the
British Government was obliged to notify the other Member States and the Commission
pursuant to Article 115 of the Treaty. If the policy was not formulated in response to an
adied upon Community competence.
urgeney, then it violated the 1975 agreement and
Incredibly, the Commission did not address Article 115. Rather, it tepidly argued
that while the British submission of its policy to COREPER technically violated the
Council Decisions which required notification and consultation on all changes in national rules applicable to exports to third countries, "the obligation to notify is not a rule
=id. at 761. 'MeIsmel-EEC Agreement aside, in 1982, Andrew Evans cogently argued dat British cd policy was,
by its very nature, designed to promote the developmnt ofthe British oil industry at the expense of Member States'

markets. In fact, the policy was "fundamentally irreconcilable with the basic theory of the Common Market ... "
Evans, supra nowa 180, at 367.
mBuk Oil(Zu) Ag,2 C.M.LR. at 761.
"I EEC TREATY at. 115, reprinted in BASIC COMMUNrrY LAwS, supra note 31, at 64.
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of Community law which has direct effect in the sense of... Costa v. ENEL (Case No.
6/64). '2* s
Yet, as the Advocate General argued in Donckerwolcke, and his argument was
fundamentally adopted by the Court, "in principle, protective measures must be authorized by the Commission in each individual case where exceptional circumstances
provided forunderArticle 115 occur." Indeed, any derogations from the principles set
forth in Article 115 must be "strictly interpreted and applied."257 Accordingly, under
Donckerwolke, the Community had exclusive power in the area of Commercial policy
which, by definition, excluded concurrent power with a Member State.
This is consistent with theprinciples announced inthe E.R.T.A. case (Case 22170).'
In EiR.TA., the Court ruled that
the Community alone is in a position to assume and carry out contractual
obligations towards non-member states affecting the whole sphere of application ofthe Community legal systems. One cannot, therefore, in implementing the provisions of the Treaty, separate the category of measures
internal to the Community from that of extemal relations.2
Hence, given the 1975 Agreement, British policy should have been subject to review
and authorization by the Community before implementation. E. M. Vllker is quite right
in arguing that Article 10 of Regulation 2603/69 did not provide a specific authorization
for the British Government to implement its policy. Ifit-had constituted an authorization
foraMemberState to take whatever action it wanted for an indefinite period of time, then
one would be left with a system of concurrent competencies despite the Common
Commercial policy and the case law.mW

Further, 'he Community has taken over the commitments of the Member States in

the field of GAT."
Under GATT, quantitative restrictions on exports are prohibited.
Hence, "[ifArticle 10 forms an authorization for all Member States for any measure
related to exports, the Community has lost the necessary control in a field for which
it

2Z Id.

-Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G., 2 C.M.LR. at 764.
'SuzeCriel, nee Donekerwolckeand Hepi Schou v. ProauurdelaRepublique
auTribunalde Grande Instance,
Lille and Diwctor of Customs, 2 C.M.LR. 535 (1977).
=1d.
'Case 22170, Re the European Road Transport Agreement: E.C. Commission v.
E.C. Council, C.M.LR. 335,355
(1971). See also Patricia ML LeopoldExternalRelations PowerofEC in Theoryand
inPractice, 26 INT'L & COMP.
L Q. 54 (1977).
WVd1ker, supra note 243, at 106-07.
2Id.

at 108.
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bears full responsibility.'* In sum, the Court's decision in Bulk Oil, this time with the
Commission's approval, represented another stress fracture in the regulatory arm of
Community unity in the field of energy.
VIII. BEYOND BULK OIL ZUG

On February 17, 1986, the day after the Bulk Oil decision was issued, the Single
European Act (SEA) was adopted by the Member States? 3 While this might simply be
an historical coincidence, it is symbolic of the fundamental tension that has hindered
Community development sweeping programmatic goals for community cohesion
identified in one institutional sphere while national autonomy is reenforced in another

institutional sphere.
The undelying goal of the Act was to show thatthe "European idea" corresponded

to the wishes of a democratic Europe and transform the relations of the individual
Member States into a European Union in which they would speak "ever increasingly
with one voice.' ' " Yet, in spite of the "High Contracting Parties" professed intention

2
of coordinating their economic and political relations, 0 there was nothing in the SEA

conext, the Cout also muddied the waters by holding dta individuals did not have he legal right to
'Id. In this
disle e a Member State's policy on the grmds that it failed to fulfill its obligation toproperly notify otherMember
States and die Commission in advance of taking any action. Yet, in so ruling, the Cout really skirted the issue of the
direct effect o an international agreement upon individual rigts. In essence, it provided a legal rationale to enable
the national policy of a Member State to thwart Community trade objectives and binding international agreements.
Bulk Oil (zg) A.G. v. Sun Int'l Lid., 2 C.M.L.R. 732,766-67 (1986). For an excellent discussion on the direct and
binding effects of international agreements in Community law, see Jacques H. J. Bourgeois,Effects of International
Agreements in EuropeanCommunity Law: Are the Dice Cast?, 82 MIC. L REV. 1250 (1984).
2EPC, sqranote 18 doc. #13, at 79.
2
"The literature on the Single European Act is extensive. The following articles represent a sampling: George A.
Bermann, The Single EuropeanAct: A New Constitutionfor the Comunity, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L 529
(1989); Jules Lonbay, The Single EuropeanAct, IIB.C. INT'L & COMP. L REV., 31 (No. 1 1988); Stefan A.
Riesenfeld, The Single EuropeanAct, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L REV. 371 (1990); Pierre Pescatom, Some
CriticalRemarks on the 'Single EuropeanAct', 24 COMMON MT. L REv. 9 (1987), Kadiyn Good, Institutional
Reform Under the Single EuropeanAct, 3 AM. UJ. INT'L L & POL'Y 299 (1988); C. D. Ehlermarm, The Internal
Market Following the Single EuropeanAct, 24 COMMON Mrr. L REV. 361 (1987T; Matin . Eiling, The Emerging
13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L REV. 511
EuropeanCommunity:A FrameworkforlnsitutonalandLegalAnaysis,
(1990);, Daniel T. Murphy, EuropeanPoliticalCooperationAfter the Single EuropeanAct: The Future of Foreign
Affairs inEuropeanCommunities, 12 B.C. IN.'L& COMP. L REV. 335; Eric Stein, EuropeanForeignAffairsSystem
and the Single EuropeanAct of 1986,23 IN,'L LAW. 977 (1989); Aaron Schildhaus, 1992 and the Single European
Act, 23 INT'L LAW. 549 (1989); A. Campbell, The Single EuropeanAct andthe Implications,35 INT'L & COMP. L
Q. 932 (1986); see also Roben M. JarvisAmericanBusinessand theSingle EuropeanAct: Scaling FortressEurope,
20CAL W. INT'L LJ.227 (1990y); Noutert WalterEurope 1992 andlBeyond,22 CASE W. REs. J. INTr'L L 331 (1990);
David L Perrott, RegionalDevelopments: The European Communities,21 INT'L LAW. 571 (1987).
2See Single EuropeanAct doc# 13,reprintedinEPC,supra note 18, at 81-87. The goal of creating a United Europe
was articulated in the "Solemn Declaration an Eropean Union" concluded at the 26th European Council held in
Stutgan on Jtme 19,1983. Id. doc.#11, a70-78. See alsoPauline Neville-Jones, The GenscherlColomboProposals
on EuropeanUnion, 20 COMMON MKT. L REV. 657 (1983).
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that either provided for a Community energy policy or structurally coordinated energy
relations among the Member States. The avoidance ofmaking energy a treaty-mandated
section, not only implied that energy harmonization was years away, but also called into
question whether the Member States were really serious about a coordinate security
policy given the importance of energy for military planning.
How to implement a Community-wide energy strategy still remained a problem
more than four years later in the Commission's 1990 Opinion on European Union.2'
In
Section IV of the Opinion, which significantly enough was entitled "improving the
effectiveness of the institutions," the Commission stated:
"As far as energy is concerned, the treaties could be consolidated into a single chapter
making it possible to implement a common energy policy." Two years later in 1992,
in the "Maastricht Texts of the EEC Treaty and European," 2 " this hoped-for integration
had not progressed much further. Buried in Article 3 subsection (t) of the section on
principles, was the statement that as part of its overall task of establishing Member State
solidarity "final activities shall include... (t) measures in the spheres of energy, civil
protection and tourism.'w
Thus, in the intervening six years between the SEA and the publication of the
Maastricht texts of the European Union Treaty, a cohesive energy policy remained
as
elusive as ever. Significantly, in 1986, the Council adopted a Resolution on the
Community's energy objectives not for 1992; but for 1995 at the earliest.° The Council
no doubt knew that national policy still remained at loggerheads with Community goals.
As J. G. Van der Linde and R. Lefeber have written: "Member States have so
far
preferred to use national policy to secure their long-term energy supplies, rather than
commit themselves to a Community policy." 71
Even though the Council's 1986 Resolution sought to begin the process of reorienting Member State thinking by creating an internal market in energy as part of the
harmonization process tm achievements in the economic market have not led to regula'Commission Opinionof2l October1990 on the ProposalforAmendmentofthe Treaty
Establishingthe European
Economic Community with a View to PoliticalUnion, (Luxanbourg, 1990). For a
general discussion on the Treaty
text, see Urich Everling, Reflections on the Structure of the European Union, 29
COMMON MKT. L REV. 1053

(1992).

'Old. at 23.
'These texts were published as part of a "Special Issue" in 63 COMMON MKr. L
REV. (March, 1992).
"61d.at 588-89.
' OJ. 1986, C 241/I.. These objectives were developed by the Coamission
in 1985. See ENERGY IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY, supra note 103, at 19-24.
hVan der Linde & Lefeber. supra note 102.
rOJ.1986,C 241/L; Leigh HancherFargyandtheEnvironment:
StrikingaBalance?,26 COMMON MKT. L REV.
475 (1989).
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tory and policy integration in the energy sectorm The market approach was a tacit
admission that the formulation of a centralized regulatory apparatus remained insufficient to overcome the resistance of national decision-making. Thus, a new approach to
integration had to be considered. 274
A. The InternalEnergyMarket
As part of a first step towards creating an internal market in energy, the Commission
undertook a review of Member State energy policies in light of the Community's energy
objectives for 1995. In the spring of 1988, it transmitted its findings to the Council in
a communication entitled: 'The Internal Energy MaikeL'"2 The Commission recognized that Member States have often taken varying approaches to energy which have
stood in the way of Community solidarity.
In the Commission's view, long-term objectives should include increasing energy
efficiency, limit consumption, and consider ways to increase energy from renewable
sources. 2 6 In this regard, the Commission took a market oriented approach and looked
for ways to overcome the formidable obstacles that stood in the way of energy solidarity
in a manner akin to the approach taken toward effecting overall market harmonization.
In its April 27, 1988 "Information Memo", the Commission implicitly admitted that
Member States were traditionally prone to safeguarding their own supplies:
Leaving aside the general problem of economic and social cohesion within
the Community, the constraints on completion of the internal energy market stem chiefly from the objective of safeguarding security of supply and
from the strategic importance of the energy industry. To overcome these
constraints, future Community energy policy must be based on the right
combination of market forces and political measures to safeguard and
coordinate the Twelve's supplies.?

2 Van der inde & Lefeber, supra note 102, at 1-2.

2" In the early 1980's, the Commission recognized that common objectives might have to be pursued without
requiring "substantial cenzalization d energy policy instnuments." See the Commission's report in COM (81) 540,
at para. 6; see also Hancher,supra note 271. at 483.
2"See the Commission's Information Memo, of 29 March 1988 (P36) and 27 April 1988 (P(88)52) which reported
the adoption of the communication. For the working paper, see COM (88).
2

See Information Memo, supra note 275.
Information Memo, 27 April 1988, at 2. The Commission also acknowledged that any future action would have
to include "determine enforcement of Community legislation." Id., at 2-3. See also ENERGY IN T1E EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY, supra note 103, at 24-25 wherein it was officially acknowledged that the energy sector"may even be
more deeply entrenched and more vigorously defended by those they have hitherto protected than in other areas."
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In 1990, the Commission produced its first "progress report" with respect to the
internal energy market.?' Commenting on the energy situation in the
wake of the
progress report, N. Commeau-Yannoussis, a member of the task force on
Community
integration, wrote that the situation was still"characterized bymajornational
disparities
between Member States of a kind liable to jeopardize the resumption of
growth." 9
Ms. Commeau-Yannoussis also noted that while the internal energy market
was
geared to the objectives of Community economic integration, energy
represented a
special case in the harmonization process. "However, due to the special
nature of the
energy sector, this general definition has to be modified slightly: the internal
energy
market must be capable of promoting greater solidarity among the Member
States and
of ensuring the optimum allocation of available resources.' ' 2 °
She quite correctly recognized that there was "more to solidarity in the energy
sector
than mere economic and social cohesion (Article 130A of the EEC Treaty)."nl
Rather,
the Community needed to reduce the risks of supply breakdowns and
improve the
allocation of available resources. 2 It also needed to devise ways of speaking
with one
voice in external and commercial relations policy with respect to energy,2 3
1 in order to
prevent a repeat of the kind of crises that nearly unhinged the Community
in 1973
especially. Ms. Commeau-Yannoussis was fully aware, in 1990, that a cohesive
internal
energy market was years away. Indeed, "the obstacles to a genuine
internal energy
market are too numerous, and often too complex, to be overcome in one
fell swoop. A
gradual but at the same time determined approach is essential, and a logical
start must
be made if all the intricacies are to be unravelled."
But there remained the twin issues as to whether it was possible to prevent
national
pressures and self-interest from impeding the development of the "European
idea" and
whether the legal and regulatory regime in energy had sufficient respect
and authority
to help do so. Significantly, in a working paper endorsed by the European
Commission
in July of 1990, it was noted: "National measures should be kept under
a common
framework to avoid conflict with the general community interest. Furthermeasures
may
ICf COM (90) 124. The progress report followed on the heels of several communications to the
Council offering
proposals with respect toincreasing intra-comnmunity trade in gas and electridty,
price transparency to final consuers in gas and electricity, and investment projects in the energy sector.
See COM (89) 332-336.
"N. Cofmeau-Yarmoussis, The Interal Energy Market ENERGY IN
EUROPE, Dec., 1990, at 45. Ms. CornmeauYannoussis' article was an update of an article co-authored with J. C.
Gubal and published in February,1990 in the
Revue du Marchi Comnun.
2id. at 46.
atId.at 49.
mid.
m

d. at 50-51.
2"Id. at 52.
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be needed to guarantee a strategic level of security for the Community but these should
be adopted and coordinated at the EC level.' '
The drafters of the working paper sought to confront the problem by setting as a
Commission task organizing "a transition from national control to security on a Community scale.'n To effect the transition, a legal approach was needed; the first step of
which involved "making use of existing Community legal instrments to incorporate the
various national systems under a common framework."7 While the paper was initially
tabled, u many of the ideas were adopted by the Commission in October of 1990 in
at strengthening the regulatory machinery necessary to deal with a
proposals aimed
29
supply crisis.
The Commission believed that the regulatory regime dating back to directives
adopted in the late 1960's and early 1970's needed to be updated. It proposed new
directives dealing with emergency measures in connection with managing supplies and
reducing consumptionr'O Moreover, it sought to persuade the Council to effect greater
institutional integration between the Community and the TEA.291
Under the proposal, there remained the unchanged obligation that each Member
2
State had to maintain stocks equivalent to at least 90 days' consumption. However,
the Commission proposed that a body be set up to manage 60 days' worth of stocks to
increase efficiency and price transparency. Yet, the proposals once again pointed out the
unresolved tension between a Community regulatory regime and national political pressures. While the Commission would (a) establish the existence of supply difficulties via
IEA analyses and intemational contracts entered into by the Community; and (b) notify

22See Security ofSuppy, ENERGY IN EUROPE Dec., 1990, at 53. Similar views were articulated by the Commission
representative, Mr.Dominioan, to the 34th General Conference of the Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) held inVienna

in September, 1990. See XXXIVth Take GeneralConference,reprintedin ENERGY INEUROPE Dec., 1990, at 63-66.
2id.at 53.
a Mr.Cardoso e Ctmha, the Commissioner for Energy, initially tabled the paper. Id.
20The initiative for these proposals was taken by Mr. Cardosa e Cunha. See the Commission's Information Note,
25 October, 1990 (P-18).
"Id. See also Van der Linde & Lefeber, supra note 102.
mSee the summaryin the 25 October 1990 Informaion Note and the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee
on the proposal for a council directive for providing measures to be taken in the event of a supply crisis in OJ. No.
C 332/75(16-12-92). The Coumcil decided to consultthe Economic and Social Comminee on thematterin the spring,
1992. In this context, in October, 1990, the Commission adopted the SAVE Programme ("Specific Actions for
Vigorou Energy Efficiency") prOposed by Mr Cadosa e Cunha as way to deal with supply problems at least until
1995. Thne program sought to address some other technical issues involved including transport, training and financial
issues. See Save Programme: More Efficient Use of Energy in the Cownuniny, ENERGY IN EUROPE Dec., 1990, at

44; andtheCommission Communication describing the objectives d program in OJ.: Information and Notices, No.
C 238, (30.1.92).
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Member States of decisions it wanted to take and convene a consultative committee with
respect thereto to deal with a crisis, it nevertheless left the responsibility for the choice
and implementation of measures to the Member States themselves.? 3
The Commission was similarly willing to deferto national energy plans with respect
to the SAVE Programme. In its 1992 communication to the Council concerning SAVE,
it noted: "Measures will be taken to promote, and where appropriate strengthen, special
national and regional agencies, which will be given aleading role in managing energy'
saving policies, in particular by drawing up regional energy plans.' 2
While deferring to national agencies and authorities on the one hand, the Commission envisioned pan-European cooperation inthe energy field onthe other. Inthis regard,
in early 1991, it adopted a proposal for aEuropean Energy Charter to send to the Council
for consideration?"
The Commission viewed the Charter as a "code of conduct" which its signatories
would agree to follow. However, specific binding international agreements would have
to be concluded separately by the signatories to realize the objectives of the Charter.?
Quite significantly, these agreements, not the Charter, would provide the applicable legal
framework. The Charter thus served, as did so many past proposals concerning energy,
as a set of non-binding guidelines and principles in which Europeans would acknowledge a common interest in improving the security of supply and the development of
cooperative infrastructures to deal with supply difficulties.297
Once again the tension between the European idea and national realities remained
outstanding and, in effect, unaddressed. This tension was manifest in the Economic and
Social Committee's October, 1992 Opinion concerning actions to be taken in the event
of supply difficulties in crude oil and petroleum. The Committee noted that when it
was consulted in May, 1991, it was asked to consider draft directives concerning the
alleviation of oil supply difficulties which were intended to update directives from the

' See also the written question No. 1090/91 by Mr.Carlos Rubles Piquer concerning practical implementation of
security of supply in Spain in the area of natural gas and Mr. Cardosa e Cunha's response concerning the integrated
grid in this energy section in Information and Notices, OJ. No. C 2115 (6.1.92). On the attempt to effect common
rules for an internal market an natural gas. See the proposal for a directive in Information and Notices OJ. No. C

65/14 (14.3.92) and previously related directives cited therein.
'See Specic Actions for Vigorous Energy Efficiency - SAVE, in OJ. No. C 23/10 (1992), and SAVE Programme,
ENERGY IN EUROPE supra note 292, at 44.
'COM (91) 36. The Proposal was based upon a related set of principles set out in the Paris Charter of November
21, 1990 following the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
'Id. See also Commission Information Note, 13 February 1991 (P(91)5).

'id. See also Commission Information Note, 11 July 1991 (P(91)665) reporting on the preparatory session of the
Conference on the proposed Energy

mOJ. (C 127),

arter scheduled for July 15-19, 1991 in Brussels.

19.5.1992 and OJ. (C 332), 16.12.1992.
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1970's. Moreover, following Council meetings in May and October, 1991, the Commissionwasreqiedtopresent revisedproposals. Yet, no new draftofthe oil stockholding
proposal appeared. Accordingly, the Committee was only asked for its Opinion with
respect to the draft Directive concerning emergency measures.
The Committee advised that in the wake of the Gulf Crisis and the events of the
1970's, enhanced institutional cooperation and integration between the Community and
the EA needed to be considered. Further, it warned that existing crisis mechanisms still
could be undermined bynational andlocal pressures. Whileitwas hoped that emergency
measures could be coordinated as the internal market program took effect after January
1, 1993, '"measures, e.g., to restrict oil consumption which differed between Member
States would also be at obvious risk ofevasion.'10 Aproposal for a cohesive regulatory
regime that would prevent Member State evasion was not advanced beyond recommending establishing yet another consultative Committee of Member State representatives that would meet with the Commission to resolve supply problems.
In the wake of Maastricht and the efforts at European Union, energy policy remains
a discordant note in the harmonization process reflecting the unresolved "contrapuntal"
tension between Community unity and national separateness. Thus, the concern with
downplaying the relationship of the energy sector to the overall scheme of European
Union at the Maastricht Summit in 199 1,with which this article opened, remains symptomatic of the deeper institutional problem that needs to be solved.

(C 332), at pats. 1.1.
'As set forth in COM (92) 145. Id. at para. 1.3. The Commitee also noted in para. 1.4 that the adoption of the draft
directives would have impacted on the "balance of power between the Council and Commission. The Committee
noted that 'both the previous draft Directives. presented by the Commission after the Iraqi invasio of Kuwait in
August, 1990, but before 'Desert Storm' in the first months of 1991. would - if accepted by the Council - have
significantly increased the Commission's power to act independently of the Council in the spheres of activity
concerned".
m Ild. at para. 2.4.
2OJ.
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